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ACCESS TO JUSTICE REQUIRES  
ACCESS TO ATTORNEYS:   
RESTRICTIONS ON THE PRACTICE  
OF LAW SERVE A SOCIETAL PURPOSE 
Lisa H. Nicholson* 
INTRODUCTION 
Attorneys serve a gatekeeper function in society by interpreting the laws 
to provide advice and counsel about clients’ legal rights or responsibilities.1  
Hiring an attorney provides some generally accepted level of quality and 
ethical assurances.  At a minimum, for example, clients can rely on a level 
of legal competence because of an attorney’s legal training and bar passage, 
as evidenced by the valid license that the attorney possesses.  Clients are 
also protected by the rules of professional ethical conduct that bind all 
licensed attorneys.  Fiduciary obligations, including undivided loyalty, the 
duties of competence and diligence, and the protection of client 
confidences, attach when a client retains an attorney.  Moreover, potential 
clients in many jurisdictions can contact a centralized reporting authority to 
determine whether there have been any disciplinary actions taken and, in 
some instances, complaints leveled against the attorney prior to retaining 
the attorney.2 
Almost all states have laws that limit the practice of law to those who are 
licensed by the state and admitted to practice by that state’s licensing body 
after meeting certain requirements relating to education, character and 
fitness, and examination.  Attorneys who assist nonattorneys in the practice 
of law in these states may face disciplinary sanctions under ethical rules, 
while nonattorneys may face liability (sometimes criminal) for their 
unauthorized practice of law (UPL).3  Typically, nonattorneys are 
 
*  Professor of Law, University of Louisville Louis D. Brandeis School of Law.  I wish to 
acknowledge Professors Cedric M. Powell and Enid Trucios-Haynes and students Gregory 
G. Justis, Jr. and Whitney L. Railey for their insightful comments.  I wish also to thank Jacob 
Levy and David Nichols for their research assistance. 
 1. See L. RAY PATTERSON & ELLIOT E. CHEATHAM, THE PROFESSION OF LAW 63 (1971) 
(“The lawyer is necessary to interpret law to give it meaning for the individual, to apply law 
to give the individual its benefits . . . .  Law is thus both a restraining and an enabling 
instrument of society.”). 
 2. See Appendix A. 
 3. See TASK FORCE ON THE MODEL DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW, REPORT app. 
A (2003), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/model-
def/model_def_statutes.pdf. 
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proscribed from providing services in three primary areas:  (1) representing 
another person in a judicial or administrative proceeding; (2) preparing 
legal instruments that affect the legal rights of another person; and 
(3) advising another person regarding that person’s legal rights and 
obligations.4 
State rules that define the “practice of law” and the American Bar 
Association’s (ABA) rules that prohibit the unauthorized practice of law 
(UPL restrictions) are regularly targeted by those who would like to create a 
“free market” for legal services.5  These critics seek to repeal or limit the 
reach of ABA UPL restrictions (and therefore the state laws modeled 
thereunder).6  They attack the counterargument that the purpose of the UPL 
restrictions is to “protect[] the public against rendition of legal services by 
unqualified persons”7 as both spurious and monopolistic.8  Some critics 
have argued that consumers are no more protected by hiring an attorney 
over a nonattorney when it comes to assurances of competent legal 
services.9 
It is worth noting that clients who retain attorneys have a right of 
recourse if an attorney fails to maintain the level of competence and fidelity 
that the bar requires.  The ABA and state bar committees exist to regulate 
 
 4. See id.  A majority of states, following the 2002 definition proposed by the ABA 
Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law, broadly define the practice of 
law. See id.; see also Appendix B. 
 5. See, e.g., Julee C. Fischer, Policing the Self-Help Legal Market:  Consumer 
Protection or Protection of the Legal Cartel?, 34 IND. L. REV. 121, 142–45, 147, 151–53 
(2000); George C. Harris & Derek F. Foran, The Ethics of Middle-Class Access to Legal 
Services and What We Can Learn from the Medical Profession’s Shift to a Corporate 
Paradigm, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 775, 775 (2001) (noting that the middle class may lack 
access to legal services as a result of being ineligible for publicly funded legal services); 
Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice:  An Agenda for Legal Education and Research, 62 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 531 (2013) [hereinafter Rhode, Access to Justice]; Deborah L. Rhode, Policing 
the Professional Monopoly:  A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized 
Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981) [hereinafter Rhode, Professional 
Monopoly]; see also George C. Leef, Lawyer Fees Too High?:  The Case for Repealing 
Unauthorized Practice of Law Statutes, REGULATION:  CATO REV. BUS. & GOV’T, Winter 
1997, at 33, available at http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/
1991/1/reg20n1c.html (suggesting that requiring bar licensing for the practice of law unfairly 
restricts consumer choice). 
 6. See Harris & Foran, supra note 5; Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 5; Rhode, 
Professional Monopoly, supra note 5; see also Leef, supra note 5. 
 7. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmt. 2 (2013). 
 8. See Harris & Foran, supra note 5; Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 5; Rhode, 
Professional Monopoly, supra note 5; see also Leef, supra note 5. 
 9. See Deborah L. Rhode, Lawyers As Citizens, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1323, 1328 
(2009) (“Despite recent improvements, the profession’s oversight practices still leave much 
to be desired. For example, fewer than 4 percent of public complaints to the disciplinary 
process result in public sanctions, and few state bars provide consumers with readily 
accessible sources of information about lawyer performance.”); see also Soha F. Turfler, 
Note, A Model Definition of the Practice of Law:  If Not Now, When?  An Alternative 
Approach to Defining the Practice of Law, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1903, 1925–27 (2004) 
(noting arguments that legal education and bar examinations serve merely as a “screening 
device” to detect “knowledge of basic legal principles” and that some “professional 
irresponsibility” often goes unpunished). 
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members of the legal profession, “to ensure that lawyers will not only 
represent clients competently and faithfully but also uphold the law.”10  In 
most jurisdictions, state-run, court-administered client protection funds may 
reimburse clients for losses caused by an attorney’s dishonest conduct in the 
practice of law.11  Civil litigation liability exposure provides another 
measurable level of protection for clients.  While nonattorneys also may be 
subject to civil litigation, the basis upon which to sue attorneys is much 
broader than breach of contract.12  Advocates of a free market for legal 
services have found strong support in the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC),13 which has continually asserted that “non-attorneys should be 
permitted to compete with attorneys,” particularly in areas “where no 
specialized legal knowledge and training is demonstrably necessary to 
protect the interests of consumers.”14  Together, they chiefly argue that a 
restriction of the legal services market to attorneys has an adverse effect on 
competition and impacts consumers who currently do not have access to 
affordable legal services to meet their legal needs.15  Stated differently, 
limited enforcement of UPL restrictions or a narrower definition of what it 
means to practice law16 purportedly will break the so-called “legal 
 
 10. Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1988). 
 11. See, e.g., Our Mission, LAW. FUND FOR CLIENT PROTECTION ST. N.Y., 
http://www.nylawfund.org/index.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2014) (stating the fund’s mission 
“to protect legal consumers from dishonest conduct in the practice of law, to preserve the 
integrity of the bar, to safeguard the good name of lawyers for their honesty in handling 
client money, to promote public confidence in the administration of justice in the Empire 
State”); see also KY. SUP. CT. R. 3.820(1)(a) (“The purpose of the Clients’ Security Fund is 
to promote public confidence in the administration of justice and the integrity of the legal 
profession by reimbursing losses caused by the dishonest conduct of lawyers admitted and 
licensed to practice law in the courts of this State occurring in the course or arising out of a 
lawyer-client relationship between the lawyer and the claimant.”); Client Assistance Fund of 
the Nebraska State Bar Association, NEB. ST. B. ASS’N, http://www.nebar.com/associations/
8143/files/CAF_Rules.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2014); Client Security Fund, ST. B. CAL., 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Attorneys/LawyerRegulation/ClientSecurityFund.aspx (last visited 
Apr. 26, 2014); Client Security Fund Mandatory Assessment, ALA. ST. B., 
http://www.alabar.org/newmember/client-security-fundrule.cfm (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. For more than a decade, “the FTC has urged several states, the American Bar 
Association, and many state bar associations to reject or narrow such restrictions on 
competition between attorneys and non-attorneys.” See Letter from the Fed. Trade Comm’n 
Office of Policy Planning to the Rules Comm. of the Superior Court 2 (May 17, 2007) 
[hereinafter 2007 FTC Letter], available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-mr.carl-e.testo-counsel-rules-committee-superior-
court-concerning-proposed-rules-definition-practice-law/v070006.pdf. 
 14. Id. (commenting on Connecticut’s proposed rule change, Proposed Section 2-44A of 
the Rules of the Superior Court, entitled “Definition of the Practice of Law”). 
 15. See Harris & Foran, supra note 5; Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 5; Rhode, 
Professional Monopoly, supra note 5; see also Leef, supra note 5. 
 16. Essentially, the debate about the purported attorney monopoly in the provision of 
legal services centers on a discussion of how the states and the ABA should determine who 
can provide what legal services to the public. See, e.g., Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Why Do We 
Regulate Lawyers?:  An Economic Analysis of the Justifications for Entry and Conduct 
Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 436 (2001); Robert R. Keatinge, Multidimensional 
Practice in a World of Invincible Ignorance:  MDP, MJP, and Ancillary Business After 
Enron, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 753 (2002); id. at 758 (“In general, most states have statutes or 
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monopoly” paradigm.  This deregulated legal services market also will 
purportedly influence the price of legal services17 and increase “access to 
justice” for low- to moderate-income individuals who have been pushed out 
of the market for affordable legal services.18  These arguments are 
continually raised even though there is little collective data on why 
individuals are not seeking advice and counsel from attorneys beyond 
limited studies citing the perceived high costs of legal services.19  Critics of 
the current paradigm also assert that the free market can protect consumers 
against low-quality legal services in the event that they purchase the 
services from nonattorney providers and, in any event, generally argue that 
only attorneys complain about the practice of law by nonattorneys and that 
the potential for harm to the public is minimal because the consumers, by 
and large, are content.20 
The core principles of the legal profession require pro bono services.  
Measures need to be designed to maintain and strengthen these pro bono 
requirements to ensure adequate and equal access to attorney-provided legal 
services.  State licensing bodies must join with their respective bar 
associations to develop a plan to strengthen the public’s access to legal 
services, but this new approach must include reliance on attorneys to 
provide that legal service.  Expanding the role of nonattorney legal service 
providers inexplicably excuses attorneys from meeting their own 
professional obligations.  Moreover, the proposed free-market system 
inadequately protects legal service consumers.  The problem of information 
asymmetry, one that exists in all professions, is exacerbated in the market 
for legal services.  Finally, definitional issues abound regarding what 
constitutes the “practice of law” as reflected in the ABA’s aborted attempt 
to develop a comprehensive definition, and the end-run around the ABA in 
state-by-state attempts to narrow the definition.  These issues only intensify 
the difficulty in determining what “routine legal matters,” if any, should be 
relegated to nonattorney legal service providers. 
Accordingly, the practice of law should be restricted to attorneys, whose 
training is regulated, intellect and moral qualifications investigated, and 
accountability readily enforced by the courts.  The 2008 financial crisis has 
roundly illustrated how and why deregulation can be costly to society.  A 
free market for legal services is similarly ill-equipped to protect the public 
 
rules that prohibit the ‘practice of law’ by persons not licensed to practice law.”); Turfler, 
supra note 9, at 1951–59 (proposing a definition of the practice of law that is neither broad 
nor narrow). 
 17. See John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice and the 
American Legal Profession:  A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal 
Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 93 (2000) (noting that higher 
fees for legal services result from an anticompetitive environment). 
 18. See Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 5, at 541 (“The limited data available 
suggest that many routine needs of low- and moderate-income individuals could be met by 
those with less expensive educational preparation.”). 
 19. See Rhode, Professional Monopoly, supra note 5, at 3–4. 
 20. See id. at 37–39; 2007 FTC Letter, supra note 13, at 5–6 (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4 cmt. c (2000)). 
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from nonattorney legal service providers, particularly those cloaked behind 
websites that offer legal advice and online document preparation 
services.21  This Article briefly highlights the problem of unmet legal needs 
for low- and moderate-income individuals in Part I.  In Part II, this Article 
demonstrates that market forces are ineffective to protect the public from 
inadequate or incompetent nonattorney legal service providers and that the 
proposed reforms only create a two-tiered market for legal services.  The 
“absence of consumer harm or complaints” argument is analyzed in Part III, 
while Part IV sets forth proposed measures that, if employed, would lead to 
more meaningful access to attorneys, particularly in the areas where the 
need is the greatest. 
I.  THE PROBLEM OF UNMET LEGAL NEEDS 
The unmet legal needs of a large segment of the U.S. population have 
been well chronicled.22  Although there are more than 1 million attorneys in 
America,23 some 64 million citizens with civil legal problems do not have 
the means to hire one.24  Many need legal assistance to avoid evictions, 
foreclosures, or loss of benefits and for other family law–related issues.25  
 
 21. See infra Part II. 
 22. See, e.g., Gail Vaughn Ashworth, No Access to Justice Is Justice Denied, 46 TENN. 
B.J. 3, 11 (2010) (“Clients who qualify for services and who have a case that Legal Aid 
attorneys can handle do not get an attorney because the Legal Aid office does not have 
enough attorneys to handle the number of qualified clients.”); Robert A. Clifford, A Legal 
Service Call to Action, CBA REC., Oct. 2011, at 12, 12 (noting that in Chicago’s Cook 
County, an “estimated . . . 1 in 4 people, approximately 25% of the population, have incomes 
[qualifying them for LSC services.]  In the Circuit Court of Cook County’s First Municipal 
District, often called the ‘people’s court,’ the majority of defendants in various actions from 
landlord/tenant, collection, wage garnishments, housing violations, replevin, and other 
consumer matters are appearing pro se”); Charles L. Harwell, Fall, ’Tis the Season?, ARK. 
LAW., Fall 2012, at 5 (“One in five Arkansans live at or below 125% of the federal poverty 
level and are eligible to receive free civil legal services.  Yet every year, nearly half of 
qualified Arkansans . . . are turned away due to a lack of sufficient resources. . . .  The legal 
issues that affect Arkansas’s poor involve the most basic human needs:  protection from 
domestic violence, economic security for the elderly and disabled, and safe and habitable 
housing, to name a few.  Those who are unable to obtain legal aid or afford an attorney are 
left to navigate the legal system on their own, often with lasting repercussions.” (quoting 
Home, ARK. ACCESS TO JUST., www. arkansasjustice.org (last visited Apr. 26, 2014)); David 
M. Mandell, Pro Bono Service in a Large Urban Setting, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 591, 591 (2010) 
(noting that in 2008, “Texas had the second largest poverty population in the United States 
. . . [but ranked forty-third] ‘in the nation in per capita revenue spent to provide civil legal 
aid[,]’ [serving only 20 to 25 percent] of the civil legal needs of low-income and poor 
Texans” (quoting Ryan Poulos, Funding Crisis Cuts Legal Aid in Texas, EL PASO INC. (Mar. 
9, 2009, 12:14 PM), http://www.elpasoinc.com/news/article_4dae6cbe-f4d2-550f-b495-
185d22b3f8f1.html) (citing ALEMAYEHU BISHAW & TRUDI J. RENWICK, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, POVERTY:  2007 AND 2008 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEYS 4 (2009), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/acsbr08-1.pdf)). 
 23. AM. BAR ASS’N, NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION BY STATE 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/20
11_national_lawyer_by_state.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 24. See SHELDON KRANTZ, THE LEGAL PROFESSION:  WHAT IS WRONG AND HOW TO FIX 
IT 4 (2013). 
 25. Cf. Clifford, supra note 22, at 12. 
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Women are disproportionately affected because they typically need 
assistance in the areas of divorce, child custody and support, housing, 
healthcare, public benefits, and debt collection.26  The “economic downturn 
has made access to justice even more elusive” for litigants in domestic 
violence and mortgage foreclosure actions, and for unemployment 
compensation benefits.27  While only 65 percent of the class of 2012 found 
jobs requiring law degrees, with 50.7 percent finding positions in private 
practice,28 many of these graduates eschewed practice areas where the need 
is greatest.29  Mired in debt, many recent graduates seek employment at big 
law firms, which typically do most of their work for major corporate 
entities. 
Nearly one in five Americans (61.4 million people) qualified for the civil 
legal assistance services provided by the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) 
in 2012.30  Unfortunately, many were not able to receive the needed 
assistance due to huge yearly cuts to LSC’s budget.31  Voluntary law firm 
pro bono hours also declined in 2011, falling to their lowest levels in three 
years, and further compounded the problem of unmet legal needs.32  Further 
still, some clients “[could not] get lawyers to take their case because the 
amount in dispute [was] considered to be too little for the attorney to take 
the case, yet the impact on the client who needs and is entitled to the 
 
 26. See Shelly Dill Combs & Ilene Lin Bloom, Women’s Disproportionate Need To 
Receive Legal Aid and the Current Funding Crisis, COLO. LAW., Oct. 2012, at 51, 51. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n for Law Placement, Law School Class of 2012 Finds 
More Jobs, Starting Salaries Rise—But Large Class Size Hurts Overall Employment 
Rate (June 20, 2013), available at http://www.nalp.org/uploads/PressReleases/
Classof2012SelectedFindingsPressRelease_june2013.pdf. 
 29. See Lucille A. Jewel, Tales of a Fourth Tier Nothing, a Response to Brian 
Tamanaha’s Failing Law Schools, 38 J. LEGAL PROF. 125, 133 (2013) (“It is true that the 
profession is de facto divided and stratified between lawyers representing wealthy and 
corporate clients and lawyers representing ordinary people . . . .” (citing JOHN P. HEINZ ET 
AL., URBAN LAWYERS:  THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 48–51 (2005))). 
 30. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., REPORT OF THE PRO BONO TASK FORCE 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/lscgov4/PBTF_%20Report_FINAL.pdf.  The 
LSC is a federally funded provider of civil legal assistance nationwide, with a fiscal year 
2010 budget of $420 million. See Quintin Johnstone, Law and Policy Issues Concerning the 
Provision of Adequate Legal Services for the Poor, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 571, 580 
(2011) (“The LSC allocates funds for civil legal services for the poor to recipients in all 
states, the District of Columbia, and several territories.  The allocation to each recipient 
jurisdiction is based on the percentage of the total population of poor persons . . . .”).  That 
budget was cut in fiscal year 2012 to $348 million. Press Release, Legal Servs. Corp., Fiscal 
Year 2013 Budget Requests Sent to Congress (Feb. 13, 2012), available at 
http://www.lsc.gov/media/press-releases/fiscal-year-2013-budget-requests-sent-congress 
(“LSC funding was approximately $404 million in Fiscal Year 2011 before falling to $348 
million in Fiscal Year 2012.”). 
 31. See generally Clifford, supra note 22, at 12 (“Government funding for LSC has 
historically been inadequate and in recent years budget cuts have severely impacted legal 
service programs in many of the states. . . .  [T]he Senate Appropriations Committee 
approved funding for LSC for 2012 at $396 million, which if approved by Congress would 
be approximately 8 million dollars less than [2011] . . . .  [T]he House Appropriations 
Committee recommended a more severe reduction in LSC’s FY 12 budget amounting to 
more than 100 million dollars.”). 
 32. Pro Bono Report 2012:  Under Construction, AM. LAW., July/Aug. 2012, at 63. 
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amount in dispute is great.”33  As a result of these factors, among others, an 
overwhelming majority of eligible civil litigants are unrepresented by 
attorneys.34 
II.  THE LIMITATIONS OF A FREE MARKET FOR LEGAL SERVICES 
A free-market system for legal services has numerous shortcomings that 
will limit, rather than expand, the public’s access to justice.  Part II.A 
describes how market forces are ineffective because information asymmetry 
prevents qualitative assessments and market imperfections cloud warning 
systems.  Part II.B discusses how the mischaracterization of legal matters as 
routine is used to justify the creation of a two-tiered market for legal 
services. 
A.  Market Forces Are Ineffective 
Advocates of a free market for legal services, including the FTC, have 
argued that “[c]onsumers of professional services, like all consumers, 
[would] benefit from competition” and “[i]f competition to provide such 
services is restrained, consumers may be forced to pay higher prices . . . .”35  
Many call for the expansion of the market for legal services to enable 
nonattorneys to provide legal services to the underserved populace, 
believing that nonattorneys can provide relatively similar services to those 
of attorneys—at least with respect to routine legal matters—but at a lower 
cost.36  These critics of UPL restrictions contest the premise that only 
attorneys should handle legal matters because attorneys are trained to 
provide a higher quality of legal services than nonattorneys and can thereby 
better protect the public.  They assert that consumers are no more protected 
by hiring an attorney over a nonattorney when it comes to assurances of 
competent legal services.37  Moreover, critics of UPL restrictions argue that 
market forces will provide the needed societal protections by driving away 
those incompetent or unscrupulous nonattorney legal services providers 
 
 33. Ashworth, supra note 22, at 11. 
 34. See, e.g., A New Lawyer’s Duty, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2012, at A26. 
 35. 2007 FTC Letter, supra note 13, at 2. 
 36. See id. at 6; see also supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 37. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 17, at 92 (noting that the public protection 
theory is based on the belief that nonattorney legal providers “will make errors in legal work 
that [an attorney] would not make, and will thereby harm the consumer of the legal 
services”); Leef, supra note 5 (“In a free market for legal services, consumers would use the 
same information-gathering techniques to assess the competence of unlicensed practitioners 
that they now use to assess the competence of licensed ones.”); cf. Meredith Ann Munro, 
Note, Deregulation of the Practice of Law:  Panacea or Placebo?, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 203, 
234 (1990) (“In sum, the deregulation advocate’s free market is premised on simplicity:  
supply and demand.  Legal services, however, are unlike products that are freely traded on 
the market:  the consumer of legal services cannot pick up a sample of a legal service like a 
piece of fruit and test it for value.  Legal services cannot and should not always be evaluated 
by price alone.”). 
2768 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
who consistently offer inferior services, because consumers will cease to 
seek out their assistance.38  There are several problems with this hypothesis. 
While deregulation could increase competition in the market for legal 
services, it also will bring more governance issues, including the lack of an 
oversight entity for nonattorney providers.  The absence of fiduciary 
obligations that extend from a relationship of trust and confidence, 
including undivided loyalty that prevents conflicts of interest and the 
protection of client secrets, are just some of the benefits that low- and 
moderate-income consumers will (unknowingly) lose when they select 
nonattorney legal service providers over attorneys.  These consumers also 
may lose a measurable standard of competence and quality of legal service 
when nonattorney providers are selected. 
Market imperfections will limit any purported consumer protection that 
current regulations already provide to an attorney’s clients.39  The recent 
financial crisis has painfully illustrated that the market response to 
problems resulting from the deregulation of an industry takes too long, that 
revelations of wrongdoing in the deregulated market come too late, and that 
the resulting societal harm arising from the wrongdoing is too great.40  The 
same consequences arguably will result from the deregulation of the legal 
services market.  Indeed, consumers of legal services are prevented by 
market forces from avoiding the risk of harms given the nature of legal 
services (as a product) as well as the nature of the market in which that 
product is provided. 
 
 38. See generally Russell G. Pearce, The Professional Paradigm Shift:  Why Discarding 
Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1229, 1273 (1995) (noting that under the market theory, “competition leads to the best 
quality services at the lowest cost. . . .  Less sophisticated consumers are not situated any 
differently from consumers in many other business transactions, who will presumably be 
able to purchase such information through consumer guides or paid referral services if they 
feel they lack the expertise to make a decision” (citing Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal 
Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 571 (1994); Deborah L. 
Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 665, 725–26 (1994))). 
 39. See Barton, supra note 16, at 436 (“[A] free-market system relies upon a 
combination of consumer expertise to choose the best and safest products, and ex post 
damages actions to control for substandard or dangerous products.  When these options fail, 
ex ante regulation may be justified.”). 
 40. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT:  FINAL 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES, at xviii (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf (“We conclude widespread failures in financial regulation 
and supervision proved devastating to the stability of the nation’s financial markets. . . .  
More than 30 years of deregulation and reliance on self-regulation by financial institutions 
. . . had stripped away key safeguards, which could have helped avoid catastrophe.”); see 
also Eduardo Porter, Recession’s True Cost Is Still Being Tallied, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2014, 
at B1 (citing three economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, who noted that the 
Lehman Brothers collapse which paralyzed the world’s financial markets “[a]t a bare 
minimum . . . cost nearly $20,000 for each American.  Adding in broader impacts on 
workers’ well being—an admittedly speculative exercise—could raise the price tag to as 
much as $120,000 for every man, woman, and child in the United States”). 
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1.  Information Asymmetry Prevents Qualitative Assessments 
The legal services market is far from transparent, such that information 
asymmetry would be problematic for the market’s new consumers.  These 
new consumers may be ill-equipped to qualitatively determine whether they 
have received objectively reasonable legal services, or even whether they 
have selected the best legal service providers in general.  This problem may 
be exacerbated when nonattorneys are added to the mix.  Consumers’ 
qualitative analysis is made even more difficult because any resulting harm 
to the consumer from receipt of objectively inadequate legal services may 
not be discovered—if at all—until it is too late to take corrective actions.41  
Even if there is timely discovery, the resulting harm to an individual’s 
liberty or property rights may not be widely reported.42  Therefore, other 
market participants may not be forewarned about the incompetent or 
unscrupulous nonattorney legal service provider.43 
Unlike produce purchasers in the market for oranges, for example, many 
consumers in the legal services market are not consistent purchasers.44  The 
typical consumer of legal services is an individual who seeks assistance to 
resolve a single, nonrecurring legal matter.45  Many also tend to seek out 
legal counsel precisely because they alone do not possess sufficient 
information to make an informed decision about their respective legal rights 
or the extent of their obligations.  Even assuming these consumers are 
savvy enough to determine that a legal issue exists and must be addressed to 
protect their rights or enforce the obligations of others, the knowledge gap 
of these first timers may be too substantial to allow them to appreciate the 
differences in the services offered by a nonattorney legal service provider 
from those of an attorney.  Often, these legal service consumers remain 
unaware that there may have been alternative means to resolve their legal 
issue than that selected by the nonattorney provider.46  These first-time 
legal service consumers are further challenged in reaching an informed 
decision by their subjective perspectives.  Their judgments may be clouded 
by fear of the unknown, or worse, they may have heightened expectations 
based on what they have seen on television or read on the internet.  Under 
 
 41. For a discussion of harm, see infra Part III. 
 42. See Turfler, supra note 9, at 1918-20 (citing J. Howard Beales, III, The Economics of 
Regulating the Professions, in REGULATING THE PROFESSIONS 125, 127 (Roger D. Blair & 
Stephen Rubins eds., 1980); Joseph R. Julin, The Legal Profession:  Education and Entry, in 
REGULATING THE PROFESSIONS, supra, at 201, 204). 
 43. See id. 
 44. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE:  REFORMING THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 144 (2000) (noting that most legal clients are “one-shot purchasers” who 
“seldom consult an attorney, and their lack of experience, coupled with the difficulties and 
expense of comparative shopping, makes it hard to assess the quality of assistance”). 
 45. See generally id. 
 46. See Turfler, supra note 9, at 1931 (“But even if educational efforts are successful at 
increasing understanding of the legal services market, these efforts cannot solve all 
information asymmetry problems because no marketing device can change the unpredictable 
nature of legal services.  Many consumers may not have the savvy to avoid an incompetent 
provider and may be unwittingly exposed to high risks.”). 
2770 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
such circumstances, it will be immeasurably difficult to make an informed 
quality assessment of the legal services provided by the nonattorney. 
Knowledge of the existence of a potential legal problem does not equate 
to an understanding of how the legal problem should be resolved.  Nor does 
it equate to an understanding that various alternatives may be available to 
resolve that individual consumer’s specific legal issue.  That information 
about some legal matters exists on the internet and in the media to narrow 
consumers’ information gap is not sufficient to overcome the problem of 
information asymmetry, nor is it a reasonable substitute for obtaining the 
assistance of attorneys.  Similarly, no one would suggest that a patient 
should self-diagnose, and then seek and receive treatment for a medical 
condition based solely on the patient’s web-based research.47 
Nevertheless, under the guise of increasing access to justice, free-market 
advocates seemingly would propose that low- and moderate-income legal 
service consumers—some who are unsophisticated participants in the legal 
services market—self-diagnose their legal problems and seek assistance 
from nonattorney service providers because they purportedly offer more 
affordable services.  Rather than yielding an increased benefit for low- and 
moderate-income consumers seeking affordable legal services, a free-
market system for legal services would provide these consumers a false 
sense of security. 
2.  Market Imperfections Cloud Warning Systems 
Free-market advocates assume that market forces will protect consumers 
of legal services from poorly performing nonattorney service providers 
because these consumers will be forewarned to avoid them.48  Consumer 
complaints, as the argument continues, eventually would drive incompetent 
or unscrupulous nonattorney legal service providers from the market, 
effectively protecting the quality of the legal work conducted by those 
nonattorneys who remain in the legal services market.49  This argument 
ignores the information asymmetry problem detailed above and assumes 
that unsatisfied consumers will sound an alarm. 
 
 47. The medical profession has faced the twin pressures of dealing with drug 
advertisements and medication information websites when combating patient self-diagnosis.  
While drug advertisements appear to offer solutions to problems, the patient’s problem 
actually may be completely different or radically more complex. See, e.g., Yael Schenker et 
al., The Ethics of Advertising for Health Care Services, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Mar. 2014, at 34, 
35 (“[P]atients often do not have an independent sense of what their medical needs are. . . .  
Advertising practices that generate the perception of a health care need may induce patients 
to seek unnecessary services.”). 
 48. See Fischer, supra note 5, at 142; cf. Pearce, supra note 38, at 1269, 1273. 
 49. See Fischer, supra note 5, at 142 (claiming that consumer choice will empower 
consumer to use the free market theory to opt into self-help methods when lawyers aren’t 
necessary, either reducing lawyer fees or driving lawyers from the market); cf. Pearce, supra 
note 38, at 1269, 1273 (identifying pure-market- and middle-range-suggested approaches to 
the regulation of lawyers that depend on consumerism and free-market principles to 
eliminate undesired legal service providers from the market). 
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Walking away, for example, with an executed will codicil or trust 
amendment that was neither properly drafted, tailored to the consumer’s 
specific needs, nor enforceable when later produced (in many instances) 
will not result in some action that would provide notice to the other 
marketplace participants.  More often than not, receipt of inadequate 
services by a single consumer will result in no more than angry calls, the 
exchange of angry correspondence, or that consumer’s decision never again 
to seek the services of that nonattorney legal service provider. 
Reliance on market forces to protect these consumers necessarily also 
presumes the existence of a centralized reporting mechanism in the legal 
services market where complaints about substandard nonattorney legal 
service providers can be received (or posted)—beyond an angry message 
posted on one of a dozen complaint sites on the internet, or a letter to the 
local better business bureau.  As is further discussed in Part III, most 
disgruntled consumers of legal services offered by nonattorneys will have 
little incentive to complain.  Consequently, no public alert siren will blare. 
Any suggestion that consumers of legal services generally seek out 
references or rely on word-of-mouth recommendations to assist them with 
the selection process to counterbalance the information asymmetry 
equation50 similarly misses the mark because it presupposes that most of 
these consumers have adequately informed community networks in which 
to exchange such information.51  Absent a mechanism to alert the public 
beyond siloed outbursts, the quality issue will remain hidden and society’s 
protection will be jeopardized. 
B.  The Mischaracterization of Legal Matters As Routine To Justify the 
Creation of a Two-Tiered Market for Legal Services 
This section examines two major pitfalls in the argument of proponents 
of demonopolizing the legal profession:  First, free-market advocates 
incorrectly characterize particular aspects of legal service as “routine.”  
Second, free-market advocates use this improper characterization to argue 
for the creation of a two-tiered market for legal services whereby only the 
monied are entitled to retain attorneys. 
 
 
 50. See also Fischer, supra note 5, at 142–45, 147, 151–53; cf. Pearce, supra note 38, at 
1273. 
 51. See Jack A. Guttenberg, Practicing Law in the Twenty-First Century in a Twentieth 
(Nineteenth) Century Straightjacket:  Something Has To Give, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 415, 
468 (arguing that “[t]he consumer really has no way of evaluating the professional quality of 
the work being done,” and observing that “[i]nformation about individual attorneys is hard to 
come by and most consumers rely on word-of-mouth, referrals, and recommendations of 
family and friends, who are often in no better position to judge the quality of the 
representation being provided”). 
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1.  The Inability To Define Routine Legal Matters 
To increase access to the legal system, many deregulation proponents 
argue that there are so-called “routine legal matters” that should be directed 
towards nonlawyers.52  To characterize legal matters as routine is a 
misnomer as this characterization fails to acknowledge that too few clients 
for legal services have homogenous legal issues.  Legal services are by 
nature unpredictable.53  Underlying the “routine legal matter” designation is 
a determination that there are some legal matters that can or should be 
deemed to be low risk; that the amount of harm that might arise from the 
faulty or incompetent provision of legal assistance is negligible at best.54  
Of course, real estate transactions, uncontested divorces, and estate 
planning—some examples of these “routine legal matters”55—are generally 
not viewed as such from a client’s perspective.56 
 
 52. See 2007 FTC Letter, supra note 13; see also Anthony Bertelli, Should Social 
Workers Engage in the Unauthorized Practice of Law?, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 15, 20 (1998) 
(“A social worker could identify the character of the legal problem, make contacts, prepare 
papers, and resolve routine issues.”); Cramton, supra note 38, at 550–51 (“Some types of 
routine client service, such as sales of residences, simple wills, and uncontested divorces, 
may not require lawyers who are as thoroughly educated and as costly as lawyers are 
today.”); Andrew M. Perlman, Toward a Unified Theory of Professional Regulation, 55 FLA. 
L. REV. 977, 1030 (2003) (“[T]here is actually little evidence to suggest that non-lawyers 
would do an inferior job when representing individuals on routine legal matters (e.g., 
divorce).  In fact, there is considerable evidence that non-lawyers can be at least as effective 
as lawyers when handling such issues.”). 
 53. Although flat-fee arrangements purportedly can be used in certain matters that may 
appear repetitive, including real estate closings and in housing and family court, challenges 
remain in reasonably anticipating the costs of providing legal services. See Linda J. Ravdin 
& Kelly J. Capps, Alternative Pricing of Legal Services in a Domestic Relations Practice:  
Choices and Ethical Considerations, 33 FAM. L.Q. 387, 414 (1999) (“The challenge for 
lawyers charging flat fees is in determining in advance what flat fee to charge, in clearly 
articulating to the client what is and is not included in the fixed fee, and in addressing the 
many potential unpredictable events which might affect the level of time and attention 
required to handle the case.”); see also Daniel R. Victor, Ethical Considerations Regarding 
Retainer and Billing Agreements, MICH. B.J., June 2008, at 32, 35 (“Flat fees are appropriate 
when the issues involved in the cases are relatively common, allowing the client and the 
lawyer to predict what needs to be done from start to finish. . . .  In some cases, it is 
impossible either to predict the total amount of work that will need to be done to bring a 
matter to conclusion or to know the level of skill that will be needed to handle an 
unpredictable issue.”). 
 54. See Turfler, supra note 9, at 1959 (“[A]n activity-centered approach provides for 
meaningful nonlawyer participation in the marketplace.  By allowing nonlawyers to perform 
‘low-risk’ services, services not restricted as the practice of law, nonlawyers will be able to 
offer many services to the public.  Legal services consumers will utilize these services if they 
decide that any risk posed by a nonlawyer provider is personally acceptable.”). 
 55. See, e.g., 2007 FTC Letter, supra note 13 (noting that Connecticut’s proposed rules 
“may be read to require an attorney for . . . negotiating . . . any transaction involving 
property (real or personal), preparing documents related to the sale of property, performing 
real estate closing services . . . [and] is likely to unnecessarily restrain competition in service 
areas that do not necessarily require the skill or knowledge of a lawyer to perform”). 
 56. See Ian Weinstein, Financial Retrenchment and Institutional Entrenchment:  Will 
Legal Education Respond, Explode, or Just Wait It Out?  A Clinician’s View, 41 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 61, 72 (2013) (“Our courts are full of unrepresented people in high-stakes 
litigation, particularly in family law, as well as in the myriad administrative proceedings 
through which the state regulates its social services.”); see also Peter J. Birnbaum, Illinois 
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As most attorneys are aware, within any seemingly routine legal matter 
lurks the potential for a more complex and nuanced legal issue.  Unlike 
nonattorney legal service providers, however, attorneys generally can 
recognize the complexity of legal matters from the broad exposure to the 
law that legal education and bar preparation provide.  That skill is 
broadened by the practice of law.  Attorneys use this skill and awareness to 
obtain facts that might be critical to revealing, evaluating, and resolving 
their clients’ legal problems through careful prodding of clients who alone 
may be incapable of remembering key information. 
The ABA’s aborted attempt to adopt a model definition for the practice 
of law further highlights the problem of delineating which legal matters 
could be excluded as routine.57  The ABA faced a torrent of criticism when 
it proffered a model definition in 2002 that, according to critics, did not 
sufficiently exclude those legal matters that could presumably be defined as 
routine.58  Unable to reach a consensus, the ABA gave up in August 2003 
and simply recommended that each state adopt its own definition of the 
practice of law based on its own understanding of its citizens’ needs and the 
available state protections.59 
 
Real Estate Lawyers and the Battle To Control Residential Closings, ILL. B.J., June 1996, at 
132, 133 (“It is a fact that the unrepresented consumer pays higher settlement costs, enters 
into ill-advised transactions from both the technical and practical points of view, and incurs 
greater risk by proceeding unrepresented [in real estate transactions].”); Jennifer Tulin 
McGrath, The Ethical Responsibilities of Estate Planning Attorneys in the Representation of 
Non-traditional Couples, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 75, 83 (2003) (“In the context of a 
traditional family, the consequences of poor estate planning are usually either financial (i.e., 
loss of tax savings) or administrative inconvenience (i.e., inheritances to minors subject to 
probate court supervision).” (citing Erica Bell, Special Issues in Estate Planning for Non-
marital Couples and Non-traditional Families, 283 PRACTISING L. INST. 859, 861 (1999))). 
 57. In 2002, the ABA charged its appointed Task Force on the Model Definition of the 
Practice of Law to determine the best approach for the ABA to create a model definition 
“that would support the goal to provide the public with better access to legal services [and] 
be in concert with governmental concerns about anticompetitive restraints.” ALFRED P. 
CARLTON, JR., AM. BAR ASS’N, MODEL DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW CHALLENGE 
STATEMENT 1 (2002), available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_
responsibility/task_force_model_definition_practice_law/model_definition_challenge.html. 
 58. See, e.g., Letter from the Fed. Trade Comm’n & the Dep’t of Justice to the Task 
Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law 7–8 (Dec. 20, 2002), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/comments/200604.pdf.  The ABA Task Force’s draft 
definition included several presumptively nonroutine activities as the practice of law: 
(1) Giving advice or counsel to persons as to their legal rights or responsibilities 
or to those of others;  
(2) Selecting, drafting, or completing legal documents or agreements that affect 
the legal rights of a person;  
(3) Representing a person before an adjudicative body, including, but not limited 
to, preparing or filing documents or conducting discovery; or  
(4) Negotiating legal rights or responsibilities on behalf of a person. 
Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law, Definition of the Practice of Law 
Draft (9/18/02), A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/
task_force_model_definition_practice_law/model_definition_definition.html (last visited 
Apr. 26, 2014). 
 59. See AM. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON THE MODEL DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF 
LAW STANDING COMM. ON CLIENT PROT., REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES:  
RECOMMENDATION, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/
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Undaunted by the ABA’s inability to adopt a model definition that would 
permit nonattorneys to practice law without liability exposure, deregulation 
proponents turned their attention to efforts by the states to adopt a 
definition.  Deregulation proponents argued that the public interest would 
be better served by avoiding unnecessary restraints on attorney and 
nonattorney competition.  To that end, the staff of the FTC’s Office of 
Policy Planning, Bureau of Competition, and Bureau of Economics (FTC 
staff) has been active for more than a decade by providing antirestraint on 
competition comments to many states (including Connecticut, New York, 
Kansas, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Florida, to name a few) as they 
individually attempt to propose rules that define the practice of law.60 
In an effort to narrow restrictions on competition between attorneys and 
nonattorneys, the FTC staff has repeatedly urged states to reject the broad 
definition of the practice of law proposed by the ABA.  The FTC staff, in 
comment letters to the judiciaries of Connecticut61 and Hawaii,62 advocated 
“allowing non-attorneys to compete in the provision of certain types of 
services that do not require such knowledge and skill,” because unrestricted 
access would “permit[] consumers to select from a broader range of 
options.”63  Yet, the FTC staff also failed to determine what types of legal 
services do not require an attorney’s knowledge and skill. 
Indeed, the FTC staff suggested that states follow the course taken by the 
District of Columbia in 2004,64 where despite broadly defining the practice 
of law, both the rule’s preamble65 and commentary, when taken together, 
 
cpr/model-def/recomm.authcheckdam.pdf (“RESOLVED, That the American Bar 
Association recommends that every state and territory adopt a definition of the practice of 
law.”). 
 60. See 2007 FTC Letter, supra note 13, at 2 & n.5. 
 61. See id. at 4. 
 62. See Letter from the Fed. Trade Comm’n to the Haw. Judiciary Pub. Affairs Office 
(Jan. 25, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_
documents/ftc-and-department-justice-comment-supreme-court-hawaii-concerning-
proposed-definition-practice-law/v080004letter.pdf. 
 63. See 2007 FTC Letter, supra note 13, at 4 (emphasis added). 
 64. See id. 
 65. See D.C. CT. APP. R. 49(b)(2), available at http://www.dccourts.gov/internet/
documents/DCCA_Rules-1-01-11.pdf.  The preamble in Rule 49(b)(2) provides in relevant 
part: 
(2) “Practice of Law” means the provision of professional legal advice or services 
where there is a client relationship of trust or reliance.  One is presumed to be 
practicing law when engaging in any of the following conduct on behalf of 
another: 
(A) Preparing any legal document . . . ; 
(B) Preparing or expressing legal opinions; 
(C) Appearing or acting as an attorney in any tribunal; 
(D) Preparing any claims, demands or pleadings . . . containing legal 
argument or interpretation of law, for filing in any court, administrative 
agency or other tribunal; 
(E) Providing advice or counsel as to how any of the activities described in 
subparagraph (A) through (D) might be done, or whether they were 
done, in accordance with applicable law; 
(F) Furnishing an attorney . . . to render the services described in 
subparagraphs (a) through (e) above. 
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narrow the definition by creating a rebuttable presumption against inclusion 
of certain actors in the definition of the practice of law.  Specifically, the 
commentary to D.C. Court of Appeals Rule 49 states in pertinent part: 
The presumption that one’s engagement in one of the enumerated 
activities is the “practice of law” may be rebutted by showing that there is 
no client relationship of trust or reliance, or that there is no explicit or 
implicit representation of authority or competence to practice law, or that 
both are absent. . . .  Tax accountants, real estate agents, title company 
attorneys, securities advisors, pension consultants, and the like, who do 
not indicate they are providing legal advice or services based on 
competence and standing in the law [are specifically excluded from the 
definition of] the practice of law, because their relationship with the 
customer is not based on a reasonable expectation that learned and 
authorized professional legal advice is being given.66 
Stated differently, the FTC staff (also unable to determine what constitutes 
routine legal matters) defaulted to providing an exemption that would allow 
certain nonattorneys to practice law and suggesting instead that states create 
a safe harbor warning that “no attorney-client relationship exists” when 
consumers of legal services use nonattorneys to resolve their legal issues.67  
These FTC proposals illustrate that concerns about increasing competition 
outweigh concerns for the public’s safety. 
Seemingly mindful of this criticism, the FTC staff also suggested that 
specific written warnings about the use of nonattorney legal service 
providers might provide added safety protections to the public amid 
concerns that consumers may be harmed when they obtain legal services 
from nonattorneys whom consumers believe can provide comparable 
services.  Specifically, the FTC staff advocateed that states mandate that 
consumers of legal services who might rely on nonattorneys “for services 
that draw close to those requiring the skill and knowledge of an attorney” 
be given some “written notice explaining the risks involved in proceeding 
. . . without an attorney,”68 purportedly to give consumers the opportunity 
“to make an informed choice about whether to use non-attorney [legal 
service providers].”69 
However, neither the FTC staff’s proposed exclusion of certain actors 
from the definition of the practice of law, nor this consumer warning 
sufficiently protects consumers who need legal assistance.  The proposed 
safe harbor warning, in particular, fails to address those instances where 
unsophisticated legal service consumers are unaware of their legal needs to 
reasonably appreciate the risks that they would be assuming when they 
 
 66. Id. R. 49(b)(2) cmt. (emphasis added). 
 67. 2007 FTC Letter, supra note 13, at 7–8; see also Letter from the Fed. Trade Comm’n 
to the Haw. Judiciary Pub. Affairs Office, supra note 62, at 8–9. 
 68. 2007 FTC Letter, supra note 13, at 7–8 (emphasis added) (citing In re Opinion No. 
26 of the Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 654 A.2d 1344, 1363 (N.J. 
1995)). 
 69. Id. at 8. 
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nevertheless engage a nonattorney.70  The FTC staff proposals also deny 
legal service consumers the essential “reliance element” of most claims 
arising from receipt of inadequate or incompetent legal services from 
nonattorney providers.  Moreover, they erode a certain degree of assurance 
that nonattorney legal services are sufficient.  Finally, and more 
importantly, the proposals completely ignore the premise upon which 
arguments for deregulation are based:  consumers are seeking assistance for 
their legal matters and, but for the perceived associated costs, would have 
retained an attorney and would have received the associated professional 
and ethical protections. 
2.  The Antimonopoly Movement’s Creation  
of a Two-Tiered Market for Legal Services 
To stabilize the quality of legal services offered by nonattorney 
providers, there are proposals to delineate between “qualified” and 
“unqualified” laypersons by use of a “certification program” for 
nonattorneys.71  Primarily, some argue that permitting these designated 
nonattorneys to provide legal service in the areas where the legal needs are 
unmet would help provide low- and moderate-income individuals with 
better access to justice.  Secondarily, it is argued that some designation 
between qualified and unqualified nonattorneys would assist consumers in 
avoiding those market imperfections that prevent full consumer protections, 
including the information asymmetry dilemma discussed above.  Here, as 
that argument continues, consumers are permitted to knowingly choose an 
uncertified nonattorney and assume the risk of receiving lower-quality legal 
services in pursuing a cheaper avenue to legal assistance.72 
Addressing the latter rationale for this proposal first, societal protections 
are not greatly improved simply by employing such designations.  These 
labels certainly are more tolerable than the FTC staff–proposed consumer 
 
 70. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 71. In 1995, the ABA issued a report suggesting that states consider registration, 
certification, and licensing of nonattorneys to ensure competence. See AM. BAR ASS’N 
COMM’N ON NONLAWYER PRACTICE, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY IN LAW-RELATED SITUATIONS:  
A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 144–47 (1995); id. at 147 (“Certification may be a 
valuable tool to inform the public of those qualifications or credentials considered to be 
appropriate for nonlawyer activities while still providing the public with a free choice of 
providers.  Certified nonlawyers may publish their superior qualifications and even charge a 
higher fee.  The public would be free to place its own value on certification and choose to 
pay or not pay any higher fee that may result.”); see also Michael S. Knowles, Note, Keep 
Your Friends Close and the Laymen Closer:  State Bar Associations Can Combat the 
Problems Associated with Nonlawyers Engaging in the Unauthorized Practice of Estate 
Planning Through a Certification Program, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 855, 885 (2010) 
(proposing the use of certification programs for estate planning, noting that “[u]nder a 
certification system, non-certified individuals are not proscribed from providing the 
regulated activity so long as non-certified individuals refrain from using the occupational 
title” (citing AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON NONLAWYER PRACTICE, supra, at 146)). 
 72. See Turfler, supra note 9, at 1928; see also Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the 
Unauthorized Practice of Law:  An Overview of the Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2581, 2595 (1999). 
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warnings that make it all but impossible to bring a claim for wrongdoing, 
including negligence and fraud, by eliminating the reliance element.  
However, as previously identified, many legal services consumers cannot 
appreciate what they do not know.73  Consider the impact on those legal 
service consumers who, based on their self-diagnosed legal problem and 
seeking the most cost-effective resolution, choose the unqualified 
layperson.74  They may be unaware of, or even ignore as unlikely, 
consequences that other alternatives might better resolve what may actually 
be more complex legal problems.  Believing that their respective legal 
matter is simple and that the law permits nonattorneys (designated either 
qualified or unqualified) to provide legal services, these consumers might 
have a false sense of security that they could not make an incorrect and 
perhaps harmful selection.  Without proof of sophistication, as previously 
illustrated, it would be difficult to suggest that these consumers are making 
knowing assumptions of the risk when they select the unqualified 
layperson. 
The “access to justice” rationale underlying the qualified layperson 
proposal will not only fail to yield the desired result, but also will create a 
new problem:  a two-tiered market for legal services—one for those clients 
who can afford to retain an attorney and another for low- and moderate-
income individuals who also may need, but cannot afford, to hire an 
attorney.  The group most in need of legal assistance would be relegated 
only to nonattorney providers.75  This outcome is inapposite to the need to 
increase access to justice.  Attorneys also seemingly would be relieved of 
their professional responsibility to society’s underserved.76  Low- and 
moderate-income individuals, like the well-heeled, deserve to have their 
legal concerns addressed by attorneys.77  Access to justice, if it is to have 
any true meaning, must mean access to equal legal services.78  
Nonattorneys do not provide equal services. 
 
 73. See Jon D. Levy, The World Is Round:  Why We Must Assure Equal Access to Civil 
Justice, 62 ME. L. REV. 561, 573 (2010) (“Informed decision-making is a necessary 
prerequisite for meaningful participation.  Informed decision-making recognizes the 
fundamental notion that choice is premised on information and a basic understanding of the 
consequences that flow from that choice.”). 
 74. See id. at 572 (“We would never conclude that a person with a serious illness has 
been afforded meaningful access to health care if that person is permitted to enter the 
hospital and make use of its facilities, but without the involvement of a trained doctor.”). 
 75. See id. at 562 (“[T]he decisions that get made in civil courts have life-altering 
consequences.  The outcome in a single case frequently has a ripple effect that extends far 
beyond the participants, reaching their families, neighbors, communities, employers, and 
others.”). 
 76. See infra Part IV.A. 
 77. Weinstein, supra note 56, at 72 (“We can imagine how permitting people with less 
rigorous, and presumably less expensive, training to serve certain parts of the market could 
expand access to justice for middle class and underclass Americans . . . .  But that idea also 
threatens a future in which people with lesser means are served by lesser-qualified, less well-
trained legal service providers who would likely wield less authority on their behalf.”). 
 78. Levy, supra note 73, at 563 (“Society has a vital stake in assuring equal access to 
justice because it is not possible for our democracy to sustain the rule of law without it.  Our 
nation’s founders understood this fundamental truth.”); id. at 572 (“Central to a new vision is 
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III.  THE “ABSENCE OF CONSUMER HARMS OR COMPLAINTS”  
ARGUMENT IS A RED HERRING 
Opponents of UPL restrictions generally argue, “We are not aware of 
evidence of consumer harm arising from [the provision of legal services by 
nonattorneys] that would justify foreclosing competition.”79  Some 
opponents of UPL restrictions also maintained that “complaints about the 
unauthorized practice of law in most states did not come from consumers, 
the potential victims of such conduct, but from attorneys.”80  These 
frequently made arguments actually overlook resulting harms and fail to 
take into account that the empirical studies relied upon are limited in 
scope81 because either the studies focused on the absence of consumer 
complaints to state bar committees, the absence of complaints lodged in 
connection with certain types of administrative proceedings,82 or the 
absence of complaints about particular actors in limited proceedings.83 
 
a clear understanding of what equal access to justice means . . . .  ‘[P]eople require access to 
the courts, to administrative agencies and other forums that is meaningful, with 
representation by qualified counsel, the opportunity to physically enter the court or other 
forum and to understand and to participate in the proceedings, and the assurance that their 
claims will be heard by a fair and capable decision-maker and decided pursuant to the rule of 
law.’” (quoting JUSTICE ACTION GRP., JUSTICE FOR ALL:  A REPORT OF THE JUSTICE ACTION 
GROUP 5 (2007))). 
 79. 2007 FTC Letter, supra note 13, at 8; see also Fischer, supra note 5, at 139 (“In 
reality, there is strikingly little case law involving injury to individuals from unauthorized 
practice.” (citing Barlow F. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law:  Do Good 
Fences Really Make Good Neighbors—Or Even Good Sense?, 1 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 159, 
200 (1980))); Leef, supra note 5 (“Bar supporters argue that without UPL statutes, 
incompetent or dishonest practitioners would harm consumers.  But that is a case of looking 
only at the supposed hazards of a free market while ignoring the palpable benefits.”); Rhode, 
Professional Monopoly, supra note 5, at 37 (“Whether lay activity presents a comparable 
problem for consumers is a matter of some dispute, even among bar officials.”). 
 80. 2007 FTC Letter, supra note 13, at 8; see also Fischer, supra note 5, at 139 (“An 
examination of 144 reported unauthorized practice cases from 1908 to 1969 indicates only 
twelve that involve actual injury to anyone.  The vast majority of such actions have been 
brought by the bar as a result of committee investigations against potential dangers of such 
an injury, not direct complaints by consumers.”); Leef, supra note 5 (“Experience shows that 
the vast majority of UPL cases are brought by bar organizations, not injured consumers.  
Actual cases of harm to clients due to incompetent or dishonest nonattorney assistance are 
rare.”); Rhode, Professional Monopoly, supra note 5, at 33 (noting, in a 1979 study, “Of the 
1188 inquiries, investigations, and complaints reported by chairmen responding [to a 
question about consumer complaints], only 27 (2%) reportedly arose from customer 
complaints and involved specific customer injury”). 
 81. 2007 FTC Letter, supra note 13, at 6 (citing Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 5, 
at 407–08). 
 82. See id. at 6 (citing HERBERT M. KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY:  LAWYERS AND 
NONLAWYERS AT WORK 50–51 (1998); Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 5, at 407–08) 
(“[L]ay specialists who provide bankruptcy and administrative agency hearing representation 
found that they performed as well as or better than attorneys.”). 
 83. See id.  For example, laypersons are assisting in bankruptcy filings, unemployment 
compensation appeals, and real estate transactions. See Rhode, Professional Monopoly, 
supra note 5, at 10 (“[M]ost enforcement focuses on laymen, especially those seeking to 
prepare documents of legal significance and to provide related advice. . . .  [A]mong those 
triggering the most visible unauthorized practice controversy are real estate brokers who 
draw up documents or counsel parties in real property transfers, and uncontested divorce 
services . . . .  Other principal areas of bar concern include lay involvement in insurance, 
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A.  Consumer Harms Abound 
Recently, the New York State Bar Association’s Committee on Unlawful 
Practice of Law recommended updating existing UPL rules after hearing 
testimony about the varying degrees of harm and injury that arise from 
unlawful law practice in matters involving identity theft, bank fraud, reverse 
mortgage scams targeting the elderly, immigration, and illegal real estate 
schemes.84  To enhance deterrence, New York recently amended its UPL 
rules to make violations a felony, up from a simple misdemeanor, if the 
violation substantially damages the consumer.85  In July 2013, Connecticut 
also raised the penalty for UPL violations to a felony when the Chief State’s 
Attorney highlighted some egregious cases where nonattorneys scammed 
victims, offering worthless legal services.86  He noted that although there 
were previous cases deserving criminal prosecution, the penalty under the 
then existing rule was too limited to justify devoting his limited 
prosecutorial resources to the effort.87  Proponents similarly noted that 
increasing jeopardy would have a deterrent effect.88 
In 2012, the ABA undertook its fourth review of state UPL enforcement 
authorities, inquiring into complaints about nonattorney providers.89  Of the 
 
debt collection, bankruptcy, immigration, trust, and probate matters, as well as lay 
appearances before administrative agencies.”). 
 84. See COMM. ON UNLAWFUL PRACTICE OF LAW, PROPOSAL TO ENACT NEW SECTION 
485-A AND AMEND SECTION 486 AND 495(3) OF THE JUDICIARY LAW 2, available at 
http://www.nysba.org/workarea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=33686 (“It had been previously 
perceived that violations of these sections against the unlawful practice of law were not 
considered a public menace but merely an attempt by the legal profession to ‘protect their 
own interest.’  At hearings held by the Committee, testimony has been elicited from judges, 
lawyers and citizens groups from all over the state that detailed the prevalence of identity 
theft, bankruptcy fraud, reverse mortgage scams that target the vulnerable elderly, 
widespread immigration abuse, and illegal real estate schemes that deprive citizens of their 
home equity and even ownership of their homes.”). 
 85. Effective November 1, 2013, it is a class E felony when a person: 
(1) falsely holds himself or herself out as a person licensed to practice law in this 
state, a person otherwise permitted to practice law in this state, or a person 
who can provide services that only attorneys are authorized to provide; and  
(2) causes another person to suffer monetary loss or damages exceeding one 
thousand dollars or other material damage resulting from impairment of a 
legal right to which he or she is entitled. 
N.Y. JUD. LAW § 485-a (McKinney Supp. 2014).  The New York State Attorney General 
also was recently authorized to prosecute UPL violations—either as a misdemeanor or 
felony. See id. § 476-a.  The enhanced penalty applies to both individuals and businesses that 
seek to offer legal advice using a nonlegal title. Id. 
 86. See Mark Dubois, Opinion:  The Authorized Practice of Law, CONN. L. TRIB., July 
29, 2013, at 30. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. The ABA Committee’s questionnaire was sent electronically to all U.S. jurisdictions. 
See AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON CLIENT PROT., 2012 SURVEY OF UNLICENSED 
PRACTICE OF LAW COMMITTEES (2012) [hereinafter ABA 2012 UPL SURVEY], available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/201
2_upl_report_final.authcheckdam.pdf.  The ABA Committee incorporated responses to its 
2009 ABA UPL Survey for those jurisdictions that failed to respond to its 2012 ABA UPL 
Survey. Id.  Nine states (Georgia, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, 
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twenty-nine bar committees that responded, twenty-five noted (without 
identifying the source of the complainant) that they had received complaints 
about website services, document preparers, and form shops.90  Most 
indicated that the violating actors were notarios practicing immigration law 
and nonattorneys providing legal advice and documents about real estate 
closings, foreclosures, divorces, and mortgage modifications.91 
Nonattorney-operated, self-help online sites that provide legal services, 
which have proliferated in recent years, are also responsible for 
considerable consumer harm.  Many represent that they perform the same 
services as a law firm but at lower costs, provide confusing representations 
of legal expertise, and often imply that prepared documents are reviewed by 
attorneys, all while disclaiming the existence of an attorney-client 
relationship or the reliability of the prepared document and requiring 
mandatory arbitration of all claims.92  Unfortunately, consumers who rely 
on these nonattorney legal service providers have been harmed when they 
obtained one-size-fits-all documents based on inaccurate or out-of-date 
forms that were not in compliance with the state law that neither resolved 
their legal issues, nor were subject to any attorney review.93  Nevertheless, 
the injured consumers were generally without adequate recourse—even 
though the service provider selected the particular form, created the 
document based on a prompted consumer profile, and, in some cases, filed 
the completed documents on the consumers’ behalf.94  Claims of deceptive 
trade practices, misrepresentation or breach of contract could be found to be 
outside of a court’s jurisdiction. 
 
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and South Carolina) failed to respond to the 2009 and the 
2012 ABA UPL Surveys. See id. at chart III. 
 90. See id. chart III. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See, e.g., About Us, LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com (last visited Apr. 26, 
2014) (advertising itself as the “leading, nationally recognized legal brand for small business 
and consumers in the United States”). 
 93. See, e.g., Susan D. Phillips, Bar Association Facilitating Access to Legal Services, 
COURIER-J., Jan. 11, 2014, at A10 (discussing how pro se litigants using forms provided by 
nonattorneys—sometimes downloaded from the internet at substantial cost—could lead to 
significant harm due to the failure to file proper motions or request appropriate remedies). 
 94. See LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. McIllwain, No. CV-12-1043, 2013 WL 5497717, at *2  
(Ark. Oct. 3, 2013) (enforcing, despite a divided Arkansas Supreme Court, LegalZoom’s 
mandatory arbitration of “all disputes and claims . . . whether based in contract, tort, statute, 
fraud, misrepresentation, or any other legal theory”).  Nevertheless, at least four state bar 
association committees have also found that the company violated their UPL restrictions. See 
Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm., Informal Op. 2008-01, at 1–2 (2008), available at 
http://www1.ctbar.org/sectionsandcommittees/committees/UPL/08-01.pdf; Bd. on the 
Unauthorized Practice of Law of the Supreme Court of Ohio, Advisory Op. UPL 2008-03 
(2008), available at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/UPL/advisory_opinions/
UPLAdvOp_08_03.pdf; Penn. Bar Ass’n Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm., Formal Op. 
2010-01, at 4–6 (2010), available at http://pabar.org/public/committees/UNA01/Opinions/
2010-01LglDocumentPreparation.pdf. 
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B.  Consumer Complaints:  Knowing Where To Look 
The lack of consumer complaints against nonattorney legal service 
providers arguably is due to the nature of the product purchased.  As 
demonstrated in Part II, many legal service consumers have inadequate 
information and very little experience with the legal system to enable them 
to knowingly judge the quality of the legal services received.  For example, 
a 2009 study conducted by the LSC found that low-income households 
encounter two to three legal problems a year but seek assistance from an 
attorney (privately or publicly funded) only one-fifth of the time.95  The 
data from another study similarly suggests that “[a]bout a quarter of middle-
income individuals and between a fifth to half of low-income individuals” 
took no action in response to legal problems.96 
If critics of UPL restrictions only review state disciplinary actions or 
letters to state bar committees to discern consumer complaint levels, they 
will overlook other sources that may reveal consumer dissatisfaction with 
nonattorney legal service providers.  As illustrated above, most of these 
consumers generally level their complaints through nontraditional channels, 
choosing instead to post complaints on the internet through personal or 
company-based social media websites, or they direct complaint letters or 
angry calls to the legal service providers, local better business bureau or 
state attorney general’s office.  Those who would complain about UPL 
violations are not even aware of where to complain.  Generally the 
information in the marketplace is about avoiding UPL restrictions, not how 
to hold individuals accountable.  Arguably, the cost of bringing an action 
against the nonattorney legal service provider would be a barrier as well.  It 
strains the imagination to reason that most unsatisfied consumers now will 
retain an attorney to proceed against the nonattorney provider to challenge a 
liability disclaimer or to file a claim for fraud or breach of contract when, 
for economic reasons, they failed to consult an attorney regarding their 
initial legal problem. 
Finally, critics ignore that consumers of nonattorney legal services 
typically have little recourse upon receipt of inadequate and incompetent 
services.  They are stymied by the general absence of privity necessary to 
maintain a malpractice action and generally lack standing to bring action for 
the unauthorized practice of law.  In fact, most jurisdictions deny 
 
 95. See Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 5, at 534 (citing LEGAL SERVS. CORP., 
DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA:  THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL NEEDS OF LOW-
INCOME AMERICANS 1–13 (2009), available at http://www.lsc.gov/pdfs/documenting_the_
justice_gap_in_america_2009.pdf). 
 96. See id. (citing Gillian Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply?:  A Comparative 
Assessment of the Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 129, 135–42 (2010)).  Apart from highlighting how infrequently consumers enter the 
market for legal services, the survey findings raise additional questions for future study, 
including:  (1) why low and moderate income individuals choose not to seek legal advice 
from attorneys; (2) what, if any, alternatives are being employed to resolve the legal 
problems assuming that many are aware that redressable legal problems exists; and 
(3) whether the legal problems were satisfactorily resolved.  Responses to these questions are 
necessary before measures to expand the legal service market should be entertained. 
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consumers the ability to maintain a private right of action for the 
unauthorized practice of law.97  Only six states, and the District of 
Columbia, recognize a private right of action for aggrieved parties to sue for 
violations of the UPL restrictions.98  Even where the private right of action 
exists, however, the aggrieved party is required first to understand both that 
a harm has occurred and that the right to sue for UPL violation exists.  As 
previously mentioned, most consumers have little prior experience against 
which to compare the present service received from nonattorneys and 
probably have limited resources upon which to pursue such a time-
consuming action for private damages.  In Illinois, only attorneys have 
standing to sue, based on the notion that the unlicensed person is infringing 
upon the rights of one who is properly licensed.99 
IV.  MEANINGFUL ACCESS TO JUSTICE REQUIRES  
ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE ATTORNEYS 
In light of the weaknesses of the free-market proponents’ argument, this 
Part asserts that the solution to the access-to-justice problem can be found 
by increasing attorney availability to the underserved through funding and 
mandatory pro bono requirements and by ensuring that those engaged in 
UPL are punished appropriately. 
A.  The Profession’s Role in Increasing Access 
Too few available attorneys to meet the needs of the populace is a 
problem that the legal profession must address.  Rising legal costs, while a 
consideration, may not be the sole obstacle that prevents a large number of 
low- and moderate-income individuals from seeking legal counsel and 
advice from attorneys.  Other factors, including language and structural and 
information barriers, play a significant role in directing clients away from 
 
 97. See Susan D. Hoppock, Note, Enforcing Unauthorized Practice of Law Prohibitions:  
The Emergence of the Private Cause of Action and Its Impact on Effective Enforcement, 20 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 719, 733–34 (2007). 
 98. Id. (“A few jurisdictions, including Alabama, Washington, West Virginia, Arkansas, 
Texas, and the District of Columbia recognize the ability of any aggrieved party to sue UPL 
violators.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Greenspan v. Third Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 912 
N.E.2d 567, 572 (Ohio 2009).  In Greenspan, the court recognized that no private cause of 
action for the unauthorized practice of law existed prior to the General Assembly’s 2004 
amendment to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4705.07 (LexisNexis 2013). Greenspan, 912 N.E.2d 
at 572.  However, noting its exclusive jurisdiction over unauthorized practice of law claims, 
the court opined, 
[T]he General Assembly avoided invading this court’s exclusive jurisdiction over 
the practice of law by creating a statutory scheme under which a claimant may 
commence a civil action for the unauthorized practice of law only “upon a finding 
by the supreme court that the other person has committed an act that is prohibited 
by the supreme court as being the unauthorized practice of law.” 
Id.; see also Appendix B. 
 99. Hoppock, supra note 97, at 734 (“Illinois recognizes the right of licensed attorneys 
to sue UPL violators on a theory that UPL ‘constitutes an infringement upon the rights of 
those who are properly licensed, [therefore] attorneys and law firms have standing to bring a 
cause of action for such unauthorized practice.’” (quoting Richard F. Mallen & Assocs., Ltd. 
v. Myinjuryclaim.com Corp., 769 N.E.2d 74, 76 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002))). 
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attorneys.100  Clearly, additional research is needed to determine what 
drives potential clients away from attorneys and toward nonattorneys. 
Attorneys know that more must be done in the meantime to help meet the 
legal needs of low- and moderate-income individuals before wholesale 
policy changes to the legal profession occur that would enable nonattorneys 
to engage in the practice of law without restriction.  State courts and state 
bar committees have endeavored to find a solution for some time.  In 
response to the large number of unrepresented litigants in both the family 
and civil courts in Kentucky, for example, the Louisville Bar Association 
(LBA) joined forces with the Kentucky Supreme Court Access to Justice 
Committee and the Legal Aid Society to help provide some needed 
assistance.101  The LBA’s Pro Bono Consortium of volunteer attorneys, 
judges, and representatives of the Legal Aid Society and the University of 
Louisville Brandeis School of Law, for example, have developed a series of 
self-help legal forms for individual use (alone or with minimal assistance) 
in divorce, child support, custody and visitation proceedings.102  The forms 
are available through the Jefferson County Circuit Court Clerk’s Office and 
the Legal Aid Society.  Twice monthly, the LBA Pro Bono Consortium 
offers free clinics at the Jefferson County Judicial Center to inform 
potential litigants of how to properly complete and file the necessary 
forms.103  While these actions work to help the unrepresented client better 
navigate the judicial system, everyone involved acknowledges that it is no 
substitute for having attorney representation at these proceedings. 
Full representation by an attorney is necessary in many instances to 
ensure that a person knows his or her legal rights, makes informed 
decisions, and, if the representation involves administrative or judicial 
proceedings, is competently represented before the tribunal.  Fully 
represented parties receive benefits that affect not just their own lives, but 
the lives of those around them.104  One study that examined the difference 
in outcomes between represented and pro se parties found that the odds of 
success of the represented parties increased by 72 percent over their 
unrepresented counterparts.105  The benefits of representation are not 
limited to the success rate.  If people feel that a lack of representation 
prevents them from meaningfully engaging in the legal system, they will 
view the government and that legal system cyncically.106  The ABA 
 
 100. See Vincent E. Doyle III, Promoting Fairness In Immigration Matters, N.Y. ST. B. 
ASS’N J., Oct. 2011, at 5, 5 (“Language issues, limited English proficiency and cultural 
barriers can render them vulnerable to exploitation by unscrupulous individuals who exact 
exorbitant fees to provide inadequate services . . . that actually harms their cases and makes 
it more difficult for a court to grant discretionary relief.  Some respondents cannot afford to 
retain adequate legal services, or they simply may not know where to turn for help.”). 
 101. See Phillips, supra note 93. 
 102. See id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Levy, supra note 73, at 573. 
 105. Id. at 573, 576 (“The research disclosed that tenants who proceeded without counsel 
achieved a generally favorable outcome 58 percent of the time, while those that had the 
benefit of counsel achieved a generally favorable outcome 85 percent of the time.”). 
 106. Id. at 582–83. 
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recognized the importance of the right to an attorney for indigent civil 
litigants when it advocated for expanded access in 2006.  Specifically, the 
ABA resolved: 
That the American Bar Association urges federal, state, and territorial 
governments to provide legal counsel as a matter of right at public 
expense to low income persons in those categories of adversarial 
proceedings where basic human needs are at stake, such as those 
involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health or child custody . . . .107 
Despite the fact that, in comparison to other developed countries, the United 
States has a higher percentage of lawyers per person, “fewer than 1 percent 
of American lawyers are in a legal services practice.”108  In other words, for 
every group of 14,000 indigent or near-indigent people, there is only one 
full-time legal services lawyer.109  As a result, low- or middle-income 
individuals are likely to handle civil legal problems without legal 
representation.110  The growing frequency with which self-representation is 
occurring is indefensible. 
Rule 6.1 of the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides 
that every lawyer has a professional responsibility to provide legal services 
for those who are unable to pay.111  Rather than eschewing responsibility 
and, as some would advocate, leaving it to nonattorneys to meet the legal 
needs of low- and moderate-income individuals, action by all members of 
the profession is required to ensure that those with legal needs are able to 
have a licensed attorney handle their matters. 
Everyone should be aware by now of the ever-increasing budget cuts that 
have negatively impacted legal aid service providers nationwide in recent 
 
 107. See TASK FORCE ON ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE, RESOLUTION ON CIVIL 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL (2006), available at http://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=
http%3A%2F%2Fwww.americanbar.org%2Fcontent%2Fdam%2Faba%2Fmigrated%2Flead
ership%2F2006%2Fannual%2Fdailyjournal%2Fhundredtwelvea.authcheckdam.doc. 
 108. Combs & Bloom, supra note 26, at 51 (citing DEBORAH RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
3–4 (2004)). 
 109. Id. “That statistic does not include the lower middle class, many of whom are priced 
out of the legal market.” Id. 
 110. Id.; see also Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 5, at 534; Steve Banks, Legal Aid’s 
Chief Attorney, Predicts Budget Cuts Will Have Harsh Impact on Vulnerable New Yorkers, 
Urges City Council To Restore Funding for Civil Legal Services; Warns of Uncertainties 
That Affect Criminal Client Services, LEGAL AID SOC’Y (May 16, 2011), http://www.legal-
aid.org/en/mediaandpublicinformation/inthenews/stevebanks,legalaidschiefattorney,predicts
budgetcutswillhaveharshimpactonvulnerablenewyorkers.aspx [hereinafter Steve Banks] 
(“‘We are mindful of the extreme financial difficulties that the City is facing.  At the same 
time, these extraordinary economic conditions are having an especially harsh impact on low 
income New Yorkers and the need for the legal help that the Society provides to these 
struggling families and individuals is increasing exponentially,’ Banks told the Council.  
‘We are forced to turn away eight out of every nine New Yorkers who seek our help.’”); Erik 
Eckholm, Interest Rate Drop Has Dire Results for Legal Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2009, at 
A12 (“Scores of legal aid societies that help poor people with noncriminal cases—like 
disputes over foreclosures, evictions and eligibility for unemployment benefits—are being 
forced to cut their staffs and services, even as requests for help have soared.”). 
 111. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2013). 
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years.112  These budget cuts have forced too many qualified clients to be 
turned away from affordable attorney representation—a number that has 
only exploded after the 2008 economic crisis.113  Mindful of this problem, 
the profession should play a greater role to ensure that a steady funding 
source exists.  One attorney-centered option to restore funding is for the 
respective state courts and bar committees nationwide to mandate an 
increase in both the attorney registration fees and bar dues (calculating the 
increase using a percentage of the average salary earned by each member 
during the prior two-year period).114  Thereafter, those excess funds should 
be directed to help shore up the annual budgets of those legal aid providers 
who work within our respective states.  Such a move would enable 
attorneys both to shoulder some of the responsibility in helping to fund 
those legal aid providers in their jurisdictions and to personally meet their 
ethical and moral obligations by addressing the cost element that might 
have prevented potential clients from obtaining the legal assistance of an 
attorney. 
Another (nonexclusive) option that would enable low and moderate 
income individuals to obtain legal assistance from attorneys requires action 
from both the ABA and all state attorney-licensing bodies:  now is the time 
to finally, and swiftly, adopt the mandatory pro bono service obligation for 
all licensed attorneys—an idea that has been bandied about for years.  A 
2012 study found that the number of attorneys performing more than twenty 
hours of pro bono services annually dipped to less than 44 percent.115  The 
ABA’s boldest move in this area to date has been to urge that every 
attorney “should aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico 
legal services per year.”116  Unfortunately, there has not been enough 
voluntary movement either to meet this exhortation or to lessen the burden 
of those with unmet legal needs.117  State licensing officials similarly are 
well aware of what has been unfolding in housing courts, family courts, and 
people’s courts (to name a few) for more than a decade.  It is a failure of 
leadership to continue to ignore a potentially viable solution, while 
witnessing so many low- and moderate-income individuals lose their 
 
 112. See Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 5, at 532–33 & n.2; supra note 31. 
 113. See Banks, supra note 110. 
 114. See Combs & Bloom, supra note 26, at 54 (noting that this option for increasing 
legal services funding was adopted by Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, Pennsylvania, Texas, 
and Wisconsin, where attorney registration fees were increased in order to do so).  For 
example, a proposed mandatory fee of “$25 per attorney based on 35,790 registered 
attorneys in 2011 . . . would [have raised] an additional $894,750 per year for legal services 
funding.” Id. 
 115. Pro Bono Report 2012:  Under Construction, supra note 32, at 63. 
 116. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1. 
 117. State-imposed mandatory reporting obligations may serve to increase voluntary pro 
bono commitments, though the sample size is too small to be conclusive. See Combs & 
Bloom, supra note 26, at 54–55 (“Seven states—Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, 
Mississippi, Nevada, and New Mexico—have mandated the reporting of pro bono hours on 
an annual basis.  The data is scarce regarding the effectiveness of mandatory reporting, but 
in Florida, the mandatory reporting requirement has brought about significant increases in 
pro bono participants and monetary contributions to legal aid organizations.”). 
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homes, jobs, spousal support, or custody simply because they were unable 
to afford to hire an attorney.118 
It is past time to mandate pro bono obligations for all practicing 
attorneys.119  Specifically, every attorney should be required to render at 
least 120 hours of pro bono publico legal services over each two-year 
period of attorney registration.  Such service obligation must be directed 
either to persons of limited means or to charitable, religious, civic, 
community, governmental, and education organizations that primarily 
address the needs of persons of limited means.120  These attorneys could 
direct their services to meeting the needs of civil litigants in housing or 
family courts, or handle consumer matters in district court.  More than a 
dent in the unmet legal needs of many could result.121  Arguments against 
effecting mandatory pro bono obligations122 ring hollow when attorneys do 
meet other mandated obligations, including those relating to continuing 
 
 118. See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, The Opportunity in the Law (May 4, 1905), in BUSINESS—
A PROFESSION 313, 321 (1914) (“It is this:  Instead of holding a position of independence, 
between the wealthy and the people, prepared to curb the excesses of either, able lawyers 
have, to a large extent, allowed themselves to become adjuncts of great corporations and 
have neglected the obligation to use their powers for the protection of the people.”). 
 119. “Approximately ninety percent of all law schools currently have some type of 
organized pro bono program.” Robert Granfield, Institutionalizing Public Service in Law 
School:  Results on the Impact of Mandatory Pro Bono Programs, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1355, 
1356 (2007).  Unfortunately, student participation even in mandatory law school pro bono 
programs did not equate to increased voluntary pro bono involvement following graduation. 
See id. at 1411. 
 120. Under this proposal, attorneys may be able to discharge the mandatory service 
obligation only if a monetary payment, equivalent to the salary of a legal aid attorney 
performing the same hours of work, is made prior to the service obligation.  Although 
Michigan does not mandate a pro bono obligation, it does incorporate a similar fundraising 
mechanism for attorneys who would like to shoulder some responsibility for providing legal 
representation to persons of limited means, but who choose not to perform pro bono services. 
See Ronald D. Keefe, No Foreclosure of Access to Justice, MICH. B.J., Mar. 2008, at 14 
(“The State Bar asks each lawyer in Michigan to donate 30 hours of pro bono legal services 
annually, handle three pro bono cases, or donate at least $300 to a legal service provider.”); 
see also Johnstone, supra note 30, at 607 (“The fee should be the equivalent of the average 
two-week salary of full-time legal aid lawyers engaged in the provision of legal services for 
the poor in the state where the licensed lawyer maintains his or her principal office.”). 
 121. This is the case even though attorneys might be unfamiliar with legal problems of 
pro bono clients.  Many state bar associations provide mentorship programs for attorney 
volunteers. See, e.g., Dean J. Zipser, Pro Bono Work—The Question Is Not “Why?” But 
“Why Not,” ORANGE CNTY. LAW., June 2005, at 6 (noting that attorney volunteers would 
have “one or more ‘experts’ whom they may call upon . . . to give them the necessary 
guidance and counseling on the key specialized subject matters . . . includ[ing] family law, 
probate and estate planning, consumer bankruptcy, and landlord/tenant-real estate law”); cf. 
Johnstone, supra note 30, at 605–06 (noting the argument about “alleged inefficiency of 
mandatory pro bono [because] many practicing lawyers lack familiarity with the legal 
problems of the poor, and if these lawyers take on such representation, they must spend 
additional time acquiring the background knowledge needed to provide competent 
representation of the poor”). 
 122. See Johnstone, supra note 30, at 606 (noting the existence of constitutional 
arguments against mandatory pro bono, including that it would be “a violation of the First, 
Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution—although due to 
lack of adoptions of mandatory pro bono there is no case law authority clearly so holding”). 
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legal education.123  In 2015, New York (for example) will begin requiring 
new lawyers to perform fifty hours of pro bono work as a condition for 
obtaining a law license.124  While this is a great start, we must question why 
this obligation should end after the attorney is admitted to practice and why 
other attorneys should be exempted. 
A final attorney-centered option would require action from the ABA and 
the collective involvement of both the private bar and the legal academy.  
The ABA should examine whether an attorney apprenticeship program for 
new law graduates is practicable.125  Such a program would be a 
particularly timely response for recent law graduates who continue to 
experience a very tight job market.126  This endeavor also would address 
concerns that law schools do not sufficiently prepare law graduates to enter 
the profession practice ready despite their rigorous analytical training.127  
Law schools, in partnership with the state and local bar committees, can 
create the apprenticeship programs to which recent law graduates may 
apply.  Law schools currently are working to increase student opportunities 
for experiential learning, including offering more skills-related courses and 
externship opportunities.  In the search for legal opportunities for their law 
students, law schools are building stronger relationships with the public and 
private bar that can enable them to serve as conduits for apprentice 
opportunities for their recent graduates.  Newly licensed attorneys would 
benefit from the opportunity to further hone their legal and professional 
skills under the tutelage of a more senior legal advisor while also providing 
 
 123. See Tom Lininger, From Park Place to Community Chest:  Rethinking Lawyers’ 
Monopoly, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1343, 1356 (2007).  The validity of the constitutional 
objections to mandatory pro bono are questionable. See id. at 1357–58.  Other impediments 
to a mandatory pro bono obligation are also surmountable. See id. at 1358–59. 
 124. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 520.16(a) (2013) (“(a) Fifty-hour pro bono 
requirement.  Every applicant admitted to the New York State bar on or after January 1, 
2015, other than applicants for admission without examination pursuant to section 520.10 of 
this Part, shall complete at least 50 hours of qualifying pro bono service prior to filing an 
application for admission with the appropriate Appellate Division department of the 
Supreme Court.”). 
 125. See John J. Farmer, Jr., Op-Ed., To Practice Law, Apprentice First, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
18, 2013, at A17 (proposing, as the dean of Rutgers School of Law, a new system, “the 
equivalent of a medical residency,” whereby “[l]aw school graduates would practice for two 
years . . . under experienced supervision, at reduced hourly rates”).  While Dean Farmer 
proposes that this system would enable (large and small) law firms to hire more attorneys, 
see id., I propose that the firms could also direct this “residency” work to cases arising in 
family and housing courts or to cases that focus on small business, foreclosure, or consumer 
issues. 
 126. See generally Lucy B. Bansal, Note, A Lawyer for John Doe:  Alternative Models for 
Representing Maryland’s Middle Class, 13 MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 156 
(2013) (proposing, as one of four models, the adoption of mentorship program for new 
lawyers to encourage middle-class representation at novice rates). 
 127. See Dawinder S. Sidhu, Civic Education As an Instrument of Social Mobility, 90 
DENV. U. L. REV. 977, 997 (2013) (“Law schools are being battered by charges that they do 
not sufficiently prepare law students with the requisite skills for legal employment and that 
they saddle graduates with too much debt . . . .” (citing Elizabeth Lesly Stevens, Will 
Law Students Have Jobs After They Graduate?, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/magazine/will-law-school-students-have-jobs-
after-they-graduate/2012/10/31/f9916726-0f30-11e2-bd1a-b868e65d57eb_story.html)). 
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assistance in those practice areas where there is some unmet need.  
Mentoring was recognized as one method to increase competency in the 
1994 Henson-Dolan Commission report128 and was recently reinforced by a 
study that new attorneys gain substantive professional and development 
skills, as well as client relations skills, from mentoring.129  “By embracing a 
residency model, the profession can rebalance the tension between profit 
and service.”130 
B.  Stricter Enforcement of UPL Restrictions 
Increased enforcement actions that target violations of state UPL 
restrictions are needed to create the necessary deterrent effect.  
Unfortunately, enforcement efforts are not uniform across the states.  
Thirty-two states reported some level of active enforcement of UPL 
restrictions,131 with several states permitting multiple entities (e.g., state 
supreme court, state bar counsel, state bar committee, and county 
prosecutor) to enforce UPL restrictions.132  Authority to enforce UPL 
restrictions is established by statute in twenty-nine states and by court rules 
in twenty-three states.133  Despite overlapping grants of authority, however, 
insufficient funding or staff resources challenge many of the states’ ability 
to bring enforcement actions.134 
Penalties for UPL violations also vary from state to state, some with 
overlapping sanctions: civil injunctions in thirty-two states; criminal fines 
in twenty-four; prison sentences in twenty; civil contempt in twenty-two; 
restitution in sixteen; and civil fines in thirteen.135  The spotty enforcement 
effort, coupled with the varied designations of wrongdoing and the resulting 
penalties from UPL violations, can impede the deterrent effect on 
nonattorneys.  Criminal prosecutions, for example, are not widespread, 
because such cases typically fall on the overburdened state attorney general, 
and where designated as misdemeanors, the time and costs of prosecution 
are outweighed.136  Though prosecutorial power may be delegated to a state 
 
 128. See REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO REVIEW LAWYER DISCIPLINE IN 
MINNESOTA AND EVALUATE THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 36 
(1994). 
 129. See Tammy A. Patterson & Mark J. Korf, The Power of Informal Mentoring 
Programs, BENCHER (Mar./Apr. 2013), http://home.innsofcourt.org/for-members/current-
members/the-bencher/recent-bencher-articles/marchapril-2013/the-power-of-informal-
mentoring-programs.aspx (analyzing the results of a study conducted by the National 
Association for Law Placement Foundation for Law Career Research & Education and 
Beyond the Bar, part of West LegalEdcenter, a division of Thomson Reuters). 
 130. See Farmer, supra note 125. 
 131. See ABA 2012 UPL SURVEY, supra note 89, chart II. 
 132. See id. chart I. 
 133. See id. 
 134. See id. 
 135. See id. chart II. 
 136. The Chief State’s Attorney of Connecticut noted that although there were previous 
UPL cases deserving of criminal prosecution, the penalty for a misdemeanor rule violation 
was so limited to justify devoting his limited prosecutorial resources to the effort. See 
Dubois, supra note 86.  Though a felony in South Carolina, the unauthorized practice of law 
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bar committee, the number of UPL enforcement actions generally does not 
improve given the budget constraints of many state bar committees.137  
Civil injunctions, though useful against the threat of repeat offenders, 
similarly are not wholly effective to deter noncompliance given the 
insufficient level of accompanying monetary sanctions. 
CONCLUSION 
The UPL restrictions are necessary to preserve the “core values” of the 
legal profession—i.e., that clients should receive ethically competent legal 
services from their attorneys, including the requirement that attorneys are 
independent and loyal, maintain client confidences, and eschew conflicts of 
interest.  Attorneys who fail to meet their ethical and professional 
obligations are subject to discipline and other sanctions.  These core values 
are what consumers of legal services have come to expect, whether they 
retain an attorney or purchase legal services from nonattorney providers.  
These core values are also what have continually maintained our civil 
society. 
 A two-tiered system of representation in the market for legal services 
will not provide the relief sought after decades of hand-wringing.  Rather 
than continually debating whether the category of legal service providers 
should be broadened to allow nonattorneys to compete, the ABA, state 
licensing officials, and state bar committees should focus attention 
exclusively on ways to broaden individuals’ access to licensed attorneys at 
affordable rates.  A mandatory attorney pro bono obligation is the solution 
that has been willfully overlooked for too long. 
Consideration of different models for delivering attorney-provided legal 
services to individuals in practice areas where the need is greater, coupled 
with better enforcement of the UPL regulations and attorney disciplinary 
rules will provide the access to justice that 88 percent of the public 
expects.138  Hard choices must be made in the face of the intransigent but 
unreasonable opposition to any requirement that attorneys play a greater 
role in seriously dealing with the unmet legal needs of low- and moderate-
income individuals.  This Article advances some options to get the ball 
rolling to ensure attorney representation to a significant segment of the U.S. 
population. 
 
restriction has not been prosecuted as such. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-5-310 (2009).  No 
private right of action for UPL violations exists in South Carolina. Linder v. Ins. Claims 
Consultants, Inc., 560 S.E.2d 612, 623 (2002) (“We . . . hold there is no private right of 
action in South Carolina for the unauthorized practice of law.”); see also Appendix B. 
 137. See ABA 2012 UPL SURVEY, supra note 89, chart I. 
 138. See Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 869, 908 (2009) (“In a 2009 ABA-commissioned survey, 88 percent of Americans 
agreed that it is essential that a nonprofit provider of legal services [e.g., a legal aid office] 
be available to assist those who could not otherwise afford legal help; two-thirds supported 
federal funding for such assistance.”). 
2790 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
APPENDIX A.  EXISTENCE OF A PUBLIC REGISTRY OF ATTORNEY 
DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS ORGANIZED BY STATE 
State Is There a 
Registry? 
Notes 
Alabama No  
Alaska Limited139 More information is available by calling (907) 
272-7469. 
Arizona Yes140  
Arkansas Yes141  
California Yes142  
Colorado Yes143  
Connecticut Yes144  
Delaware Yes145  
Florida Limited146 Can find a history of a specific attorney’s 
discipline if that attorney’s name is known 
Georgia Limited147 Can find only recent disciplinary actions 
 
 139. Resources for the Public/Complaints Against Attorneys, ALASKA B. ASS’N, 
https://www.alaskabar.org/servlet/content/resources_for_the.html (last visited Apr. 26, 
2014). 
 140. Attorney Misconduct, ARIZ. JUD. BRANCH, http://www.azcourts.gov/
attorneydiscipline/Home.aspx (lasted visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 141. Opinions and Disciplinary Decisions, Ark. Judiciary, https://courts.arkansas.gov/
opinions-and-disciplinary-decisions (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 142. California State Bar Court Reporter, ST. B. CT. CAL., http://www.statebarcourt.ca.
gov/Opinions/CaliforniaStateBarCourtReporter.aspx (last visited Apr. 26, 2014); Non-
published Opinions, ST. B. CT. CAL., http://www.statebarcourt.ca.gov/Opinions/
NonPublishedOpinions.aspx (last visited Apr. 26, 2014); Published Opinions, ST. B. CT. 
CAL., http://www.statebarcourt.ca.gov/Opinions/PublishedOpinions.aspx (last visited Apr. 
26, 2014). 
 143. Office of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge, COLO. SUPREME CT., 
http://www.coloradosupremecourt.com/PDJ/pdj.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2014); 
Opinions/Rules/Statutes, COLO. B. ASS’N, http://www.cobar.org/ors.cfm (last visited Apr. 26, 
2014). 
 144. Grievance Decisions, ST. CONN. JUD. BRANCH, http://jud.ct.gov/sgcdecisions/
names.aspx (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 145. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, Digest of Lawyer Discipline, DEL. ST. COURTS, 
http://courts.delaware.gov/odc/digest/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 146. FLA. B., http://www.floridabar.org/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
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Hawaii Limited148 Can find status of attorneys; no ability to find the 
case itself 
Idaho Limited149 Can find recent history online; attorney’s 
discipline history can be requested 
Illinois Yes150 Can search by specific attorney’s name to see if 
he or she has been disciplined and can find 
recent status changes without knowing the name 
of a specific attorney 
Indiana Yes151  
Iowa Limited152 Can search by specific attorney’s name; recent 
(60 days) disciplinary actions can also be found 
Kansas Limited153 Can search the status of an attorney by name 
Kentucky Limited154 Can find whether an attorney is currently active 
or is inactive 
Louisiana Yes155  
Maine Yes156  
Maryland Yes157  
 
 147. Recent Attorney Discipline, ST. B. GA., http://www.gabar.org/forthepublic/recent-
discipline.cfm (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 148. Not Authorized To Practice Law in Hawaii, HAW. ST. B. ASS’N, 
http://hsba.org/resources/1/Status/inactive.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 149. Attorney Discipline, IDAHO ST. B., http://isb.idaho.gov/bar_counsel/bc_info_
public.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 150. Lawyer Search, ATT’Y REGISTRATION & DISCIPLINARY COMM’N SUPREME CT. ILL., 
https://www.iardc.org/lawyersearch.asp (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 151. Orders and Opinions Regarding Final Resolution in Attorney Discipline Cases 
2014, JUD. BRANCH IND., http://www.in.gov/judiciary/2768.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 152. Recent Attorney Disability and Disciplinary Orders (Past 60 Days), IOWA JUD. 
BRANCH, https://www.iacourtcommissions.org/icc/SearchDiscipline.do?action=recentSearch 
(last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 153. Attorney Directory, KAN. SUPREME CT., http://intranet.kscourts.org:7780/pls/ar/
ATTORNEY_REGISTRATION_PKG.request_attorney (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 154. Membership, Lawyer Locator, KY. ST. B. ASS’N, http://www.kybar.org/26 (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 155. Recent Rulings, LA. ATT’Y DISCIPLINARY BOARD, http://www.ladb.org/NXT/
gateway.dll?f=templates$fn=default.htm$vid=ladb:ladbview (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 156. Attorney Directory, Attorney Information Search, ME. BOARD OVERSEERS B., 
https://www1.maine.gov/cgi-bin/online/maine_bar/attorney_directory.pl (last visited Apr. 
26, 2014). 
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Massachusetts Limited158 Can search by specific attorney’s name 
Michigan Limited159 Can search by specific attorney’s name; recent 
opinions (two years) can also be found 
Minnesota Yes160  
Mississippi Limited161 Can search by specific attorney’s name, firm, 
city, or county 
Missouri Yes162 Anyone can find out if a Missouri attorney has a 
record of public discipline by contacting the 
Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel.    
Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, 3335 
American Avenue, Jefferson City, MO 65109  
Phone (573) 635-7400; Fax (573) 635-2240. 
Montana Limited163 Can search by specific attorney’s name 
Nebraska Limited164 Can search by specific attorney’s name 
Nevada Limited165 Can search by specific attorney’s name or 
location for discipline since 2003 
New 
Hampshire 
Yes166 Can search by several criteria 
 
 157. Maryland Attorneys—Disciplinary Actions, FY 2006 to Present, MD. COURTS, 
http://www.courts.state.md.us/attygrievance/sanctions.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 158. How To Search for an Attorney by Name or City, MASS. BOARD B. OVERSEERS, 
http://massbbo.org/bbolookup.php (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 159. Attorney Database, ATT’Y DISCIPLINE BOARD ST. MICH., http://www.adbmich.org/
CHECKER.HTM (last visited Apr. 26, 2014); Recent Board Orders and Opinions, ATT’Y 
DISCIPLINE BOARD ST. MICH., http://www.adbmich.org/RECENTOPN.HTM (last visited 
Apr. 26, 2014). 
 160. Minnesota Lawyer Public Decision Search, MINN. LAW. PROF. RESP. BOARD, 
http://lprb.mncourts.gov/LawyerSearch/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 161. Lawyer Directory, MISS. B., http://msbar.org/lawyer-directory.aspx (last visited Apr. 
26, 2014). 
 162. For the Public:  Disciplinary Proceedings, OFF. CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNS. MO., 
http://mochiefcounsel.org/ocdc.htm?id=24&cat=2 (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 163. Public Discipline of Attorneys, OFF. DISCIPLINARY COUNS. FOR ST. MONT., 
http://www.montanaodc.org/Portals/ODC/Public%20Discipline%20List.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 26, 2014). 
 164. Public Orders Imposed Against Nebraska Attorneys, ST. NEB. JUD. BRANCH, 
http://supremecourt.ne.gov/attorney-sanctions (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 165. Find a Lawyer, ST. B. NEV., http://nvbar.org/find-a-lawyer (last visited Apr. 26, 
2014). 
2014] ACCESS TO ATTORNEYS 2793 
New Jersey Yes167  
New Mexico Limited168 Can find whether an attorney is currently active 
or inactive 




Yes170 Can search by specific attorney’s name or by 
recent decisions 
North Dakota Limited More information is available by calling 
(701) 328-2221. 
Ohio Limited171 Can search by specific attorney’s name 
Oklahoma No  
Oregon Yes172  
Pennsylvania Limited173 Can search by specific attorney’s name 
Rhode Island Limited174 Can search by specific attorney’s name 
South Carolina Limited175 Recent (2 year) discipline history 
 
 166. Search for Public Discipline Issued Since January 1, 2004, N.H. SUPREME CT. ATT’Y 
DISCIPLINE SYS., http://www.nhattyreg.org/search.php (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 167. Disciplinary Histories, N.J. COURTS, http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/oae/discipline
.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 168. Find an Attorney, ST. B. N.M., http://www.nmbar.org/findattorney/attorneyfinder
.aspx (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 169. Attorney Search, N.Y. ST. UNIFIED CT. SYS., http://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/attorney/
AttorneySearch (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 170. Disciplinary Actions from the Most Recent Journal, N.C. ST. B., 
http://www.ncbar.com/discipline/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 171. Attorney Information Search, SUPREME CT. OHIO & OHIO JUD. SYS., 
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/AttySvcs/AttyReg/Public_AttorneyInformation.asp (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 172. Discipline, OR. ST. B., http://www.osbar.org/publications/dbreporter/dbreport.html 
(last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 173. Look Up a PA Attorney, DISCIPLINARY BOARD SUPREME CT. PA., 
http://www.padisciplinaryboard.org/look-up/pa-attorney-search.php (last visited Apr. 26, 
2014). 
 174. Attorney Search, R.I. JUD., http://rijrs.courts.ri.gov/rijrs/attorneyDisclaimer.do (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 175. Member Discipline, S.C. B., http://www.scbar.org/MemberResources/Publications/
SouthCarolinaLawyer/WhatsNew/MemberDiscipline.aspx (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
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South Dakota No  
Tennessee Limited176 Can search by specific attorney’s name 
Texas Limited177 Can search by specific attorney’s name 
Utah Limited178 Notices of suspension, disbarment, resignation 
with discipline pending, transfer to and from 
disability status, and petitions for reinstatements 
or re-admissions are published in the Utah Bar 
Journal and in a newspaper of general 
circulation in each judicial district within the 
state in which the lawyer maintained an office 
for the practice of law.  Additionally, carrying 
out its responsibility to provide informal 
guidance on issues related to professional 
conduct, the bar publishes disciplinary results in 
the Utah Bar Journal.  The bar publishes 
summaries of private admonitions but omits any 
details that identify the lawyer. 
Vermont Yes179  
Virginia Limited180 Can search by specific attorney’s name 
Washington Limited181 Can search by specific attorney’s name 
West Virginia Yes182  
 
 176. Online Attorney Directory, BOARD PROF. RESP. SUPREME CT. TENN., 
http://www.tbpr.org/Consumers/AttorneySearch/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 177. Find a Lawyer, ST. B. TEX., http://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?
Section=Find_A_Lawyer&Template=/CustomSource/MemberDirectory/Search_Form_Clien
t_Main.cfm (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 178. Office of Professional Conduct Frequently Asked Questions, UTAH ST. B., 
http://www.utahbar.org/opc/office-of-professional-conduct-frequently-asked-questions/#a21 
(last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 179. Legal Community, Attorney Discipline Information, Professional Responsibility 
Program, ST. VT. JUDICIARY, https://www.vermontjudiciary.org/LC/attydiscipline.aspx (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 180. Attorney Records Search, VA. ST. B., http://www.vsb.org/attorney/attSearch.asp?S=
D (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 181. Discipline Notice Search, WASH. ST. B. ASS’N, https://www.mywsba.org/
DisciplineNotice.aspx (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 182. Recent Disciplinary Decisions, Supreme Court Decisions, W.V. OFF. DISCIPLINARY 
COUNS., http://www.wvodc.org/decisionslist.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
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Wisconsin Limited183 Can search by specific attorney’s name 
Wyoming Limited184 Organized by the rule violated 
APPENDIX B.  AVAILABILITY OF PRIVATE ACTION TO ENFORCE CLAIMS OF 
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW ORGANIZED BY STATE 
Alabama Definition of “Practice”185 Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Broad Yes186 
Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
The Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee receives, reviews, 
investigates, and acts on complaints alleging the unauthorized 
practice of law by individuals or entities not licensed to practice 
law in the State of Alabama, and assists in educating attorneys, 
judges, and the public regarding unauthorized practice of law 
issues.  It must be noted that while the Unauthorized Practice of 
Law Committee may conduct preliminary investigations of 
complaints, it does not act as counsel for complainants or provide 
them with legal services or advice.187 
 
Alaska Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Broad No 
Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 




 183. For the Public: Lawyer Regulation, WIS. CT. SYS., http://wicourts.gov/services/
public/lawyerreg/status.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 184. Disciplinary Summary, WYO. ST. B., http://www.wyomingbar.org/pdf/Disciplinary
_Summary.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 185. All descriptions of the definitions of “practice” are based on the ABA Task Force on 
the Model Definition of the Practice of Law’s appendix collecting state definitions of the 
practice of law. See TASK FORCE ON THE MODEL DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW, supra 
note 3, app. A. 
 186. Hoppock, supra note 97, at 733–34. 
 187. ASB’s UPL Committee, ALA. ST. B., http://www.alabar.org/public/upl.cfm (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 188. ABA 2012 UPL SURVEY, supra note 89, chart I. 
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Arizona Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Broad (many exceptions)  
Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
 
 
Arkansas Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
“[I]mpossible to frame any 
comprehensible definition . . .  
each case must be decided on its 
own particular facts.” 
Yes189 
Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
 
 
California Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Broad  




Colorado Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 







 189. Hoppock, supra note 97, at 733–34. 
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Colorado Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
The Colorado Supreme Court Office of Attorney Regulation 
Counsel investigates and prosecutes complaints involving the 
unauthorized practice of law (UPL).  The process begins with a 
UPL complaint being received and the intake department 
conducts the initial investigation, which can eventually be 
referred to the Colorado Supreme Court for action.190 
 
Connecticut Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Broad  
Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
 
 
Delaware Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Broad No191 





 190. The Unauthorized Practice of Law in Colorado, COLO. SUPREME CT., 
http://coloradosupremecourt.com/Regulation/UPL.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2014); UPL 
Complaint Process, COLO. SUPREME CT., http://coloradosupremecourt.com/Regulation/UPL_
Process/Copy%20of%20UPL_Process.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 191. Johanna Namir, UPL Lawsuit Dismissed As Improper Private Cause of Action, L. 
FORWARD (Sept. 23, 2010, 4:34 PM), http://lawforward.legalzoom.com/unauthorized-
practice-of-law/upl-lawsuit-dismissed-as-improper-private-cause-of-action/. 
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Florida Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Broad No192 
Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
Treated as a criminal prosecution.  State attorney’s office 
prosecutes.193 
 
Georgia Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Broad No194 
Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
“The State Bar of Georgia, the Judicial Council of the State of 
Georgia, and all organized bar associations of this state are each 
authorized to inquire into and investigate:  (1) any charges or 
complaints of unauthorized or unlawful practice of law; . . .  
(3) any charges or complaints that any person, in violation of 
Code Section 15-19-55 or rules promulgated by the Supreme 
Court, is orally or by writing, for a consideration then or 
afterwards to be charged or received by himself or another, 
offering or tendering to another person, without the solicitation of 
the person, the services of an attorney at law, resident or 
nonresident of this state, in order for the attorney to institute an 
action or represent the person in the courts of this or any other 
state or of the United States in the enforcement or collection by 
law of any claim, debt, or demand of the person against another 
or is suggesting or urging the bringing of such action; and 
(4) Any charge or complaints that any person is engaged in the 
practice of seeking out and proposing to other persons that they 
present and urge through any attorney at law the collection of any 
claim, debt, or demand of such person against another.”195 
 
 
 192. Goldberg v. Merrill Lynch Credit Corp, 981 So. 2d 550, 553 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2008). 
 193. ABA 2012 UPL SURVEY, supra note 89, chart I. 
 194. Oswell v. Nixon, 620 S.E.2d 419, 421–22 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005). 
 195. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-19-57 (2010). 
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Hawaii Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Broad No196 
Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
Criminal statute enforced by attorney general.197 
 
Idaho Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Broad No 
Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
The Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee (a state bar 
committee) supervises local committees, receives reports 
concerning investigation, and makes recommendations regarding 
disposition to the Board of Commissioners.198 
 
Illinois Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Broad Yes but only on a theory that 
UPL “constitutes an 
infringement upon the rights 
of those who are properly 
licensed, [therefore] 
attorneys and law firms have 
standing to bring a cause of 
action for such unauthorized 




 196. Reliable Collection Agency, Ltd. v. Cole, 584 P.2d 107, 111 (Haw. 1978). 
 197. ABA 2012 UPL SURVEY, supra note 89, chart I. 
 198. Idaho State Bar Committees, IDAHO ST. B., http://isb.idaho.gov/general/committees
.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 199. Richard F. Mallen & Assocs. v. Myinjuryclaim.com, 769 N.E.2d 74, 76 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2002) (finding that UPL “constitutes an infringement upon the rights of those who are 
properly licensed, [therefore] attorneys and law firms have standing to bring a cause of 
action for such unauthorized practice”). 
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Illinois Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
After a request for investigation is submitted, the task force on 
the unauthorized practice of law investigates allegations of 
unauthorized practice of law and can take civil actions if 
necessary or warranted.  County prosecutors must bring any 
criminal action.200 
 
Indiana Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Broad No201 





Iowa Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Broad No 
Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
Individuals can file complaints with the Commission on the 
Unauthorized Practice of Law (a commission of the Iowa 
Supreme Court).  The commission will then request information 
about the charge from the respondent.  The complaint will be 
investigated by staff at the Office of Professional Regulation, and 
the complaint and any materials gathered by the staff will be 
forwarded to the commission at their next regular quarterly 
meeting. At the quarterly meeting, the complaint will be assigned 
to a commission member for follow up.  Depending on the 
circumstances and facts, the complaint may be closed, referred to 




 200. Task Force on Unauthorized Practice of Law, ILL. ST. B. ASS’N, 
http://www.isba.org/resources/upl (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 201. Grace Vill. Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Lancaster Pollard & Co., 896 F. Supp. 2d 
757, 766–67 (N.D. Ind. 2012). 
 202. The Commission on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, IOWA JUD. BRANCH, 
http://www.iowacourts.gov/For_Attorneys/Professional_Regulation/Commission_on_Unaut
horized_Practice_of_Law/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
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Kansas Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Broad  




Kentucky Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Broad No 
Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
The role of the Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee, of the 
state bar association, is to render advisory opinions on questions 
of whether a particular activity may constitute the unauthorized 
practice of law by a nonlawyer.  Formal unauthorized practice of 
law opinions may be issued by the Board of Governors upon 
recommendation of the Unauthorized Practice of Law 
Committee.203 
 
Louisiana Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Representing another or 
advising/counseling someone as 
to secular law for consideration 
or drawing documents for 
consideration 
 
Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
 
 
Maine Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 




 203. KBA Committees, KY. B. ASS’N, http://www.kybar.org/72 (last visited Apr. 26, 
2014). 
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Maine Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
 
 
Maryland Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Broad  





Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Broad Yes, but only on an unlawful 
competition theory (i.e., 
only attorneys allowed 
private cause of action).204 
Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
 
 
Michigan Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Practice of law is left to the 
discretion of courts, but 
“charging a fee can take an 
otherwise incidental act into the 
realm of the unauthorized 
practice of law.”205 
 






 204. Steinberg v. McKay, 3 N.E.2d 23, 24 (Mass. 1936). 
 205. TASK FORCE ON THE MODEL DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 3, app. 
A, at 15. 
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Minnesota Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
“What is and what is not the 
practice of law cannot be drawn 
with precision.”206 
No207 
Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
 
 
Mississippi Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Narrow; however, court opinions 
make it clear that there are many 
other acts (not listed in the 
statute) which might be 
performed by an unlicensed 
person which may also constitute 
the practice of law. 
No208 
Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
 
 
Missouri Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Broad No209 






 206. Id. app. A, at 16. 
 207. Kronzer v. First Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis, 235 N.W.2d 187, 191–94 (Minn. 1975) 
(finding that plaintiff has no standing to bring a direct action for the unauthorized practice of 
law, but may be able to prevail on a negligence claim). 
 208. Thorne v. Prommis Solutions Holding Corp. (In re Thorne), 471 B.R. 496, 509 
(Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2012). 
 209. Janssen v. Guar. Land Title Co., 571 S.W.2d 702, 706 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). 
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Montana Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
What is and what is not the 
practice of law cannot be drawn 
with precision. 
 
Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
 
 
Nebraska Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Determine in each case whether 
the defendant “purported to 
exercise the legal training, 
experience and skill of an 
attorney at law without a license 
to do so.”210 
No211 
Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
 
 
Nevada Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
 No212 





 210. TASK FORCE ON THE MODEL DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 3, app. 
A, at 17. 
 211. Richmond v. Case, 647 N.W.2d 90, 96 (Neb. 2002) (denying the plaintiff’s “private 
cause of action for money damages against another for the unauthorized practice of law” 
because it was an issue of first impression in the state and had not been addressed below). 
 212. Jordan v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles & Pub. Safety, 110 P.3d 30, 50 (Nev. 
2005), abrogated on other grounds by Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 181 P.3d 
670 (Nev. 2008). 
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New 
Hampshire 
Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
“matters involving professional 
judgment”213 
 
Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
 
 
New Jersey Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
 “asking whether the public 
interest is disserved by 





New Jersey Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
  “On request of any person, or in connection with the 
consideration of any complaint or any investigation made on its 
own initiative, the committee may render advisory opinions 
relating to the unauthorized practice of law and arrange for their 
publication.  The committee shall have jurisdiction over and shall 
inquire into and consider complaints alleging the unauthorized 
practice of law by any natural or other persons or entity.   
  
 
 213. TASK FORCE ON THE MODEL DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 3, app. 
A, at 18. 
 214. Id. 
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New Jersey “The committee may, on its own initiative, and without any 
complaint being made to it, investigate any condition or situation 
of which it becomes aware that may involve the unauthorized 
practice of law.  Within 20 days after an opinion is published, or 
within 30 days after any final action of the Committee on the 
Unauthorized Practice of Law other than the publication of any 
opinion, any aggrieved member of the bar, bar association, 
person or entity may seek review thereof by serving on the 
Attorney General a notice of petition for review by the Supreme 
Court and by filing the original notice with the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court.  If it appears that the conduct in question 
involves the unauthorized practice of law, the committee shall 
endeavor to have the person, persons or entity enter into a written 
agreement to refrain in the future from such conduct.  
“The informal disposition of matters as provided in this rule is 
encouraged. If, after a finding by the committee of the 
unauthorized practice of law, a person or entity declines to enter 
into a written agreement pursuant to this rule, the committee shall 
refer the matter to an appropriate law enforcement or other 
agency.  When the committee concludes from its preliminary 
investigation or from the failure of an informal conference as 
provided in R. 1:22-5 that an amicable disposition of any matter 
within its jurisdiction with the person, persons or entity 
concerned cannot be effected, it shall, based upon the nature of 
the complaint, the relief sought, and the facts as then known, 
refer the matter to the law enforcement or other agency the 
committee determines is best suited to conduct an investigation 




Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Broad  




 215. N.J. CT. R. 1:22. 
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New York Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Broad No216 
Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 




Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Broad No 
Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
The North Carolina State Bar has the authority by statute to 
investigate allegations of unauthorized practice of law as well as 
the district attorney.  The State Bar may seek injunctive relief. 
District attorneys may prosecute charges of unauthorized practice 
of law as a class 1 criminal misdemeanor.  The Authorized 
Practice Committee of the North Carolina State Bar investigates 
complaints of unauthorized practice of law. The procedures for 
the committee are found at 27 N.C. ADMIN CODE 1D.0104 




Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
  







 216. Lawrence v. Houston, 567 N.Y.S.2d 962, 964 (App. Div. 1991). 
 217. ABA 2012 UPL SURVEY, supra note 89, chart I. 
 218. Preventing Unlicensed Legal Practice, N.C. ST. B., http://www.ncbar.gov/public/
upl.asp (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
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Ohio Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Broad Yes, but no court has 
subject-matter jurisdiction 
over a claim for the UPL 
against a person unless the 
Supreme Court of Ohio has 
first made a finding that the 
very person is engaged in 
the UPL.219 
Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
The Board on the Unauthorized Practice of Law of the Supreme 
Court of Ohio conducts hearings, preserves the record, and 
makes findings and recommendations to the supreme court in 
cases involving the alleged unauthorized practice of law.  The 
unauthorized practice of law committee of a bar association or 
disciplinary counsel shall investigate any matter referred to it or 
that comes to its attention and may file a complaint pursuant to 
Rule 7 of the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the 
Bar of Ohio.  The attorney general may also file a complaint 
pursuant to this rule.  Each bar association, disciplinary counsel, 
and the attorney general shall file with the board, on a form 
provided by the board, a report of its activity on unauthorized 
practice of law complaints, investigations, and other matters 
requested by the board.220 
 
Oklahoma Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Broad  




 219. Lowry v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., No. 4:11CV02259, 2012 WL 2953109, at *2 (N.D. 
Ohio July 19, 2012). 
 220. OHIO SUP. CT. R. 7; Board on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, SUPREME CT. OHIO 
& OHIO JUD. SYS., http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/boards/upl/ (last visited Apr. 26, 
2014). 
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Oregon Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Broad No 
Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
The Oregon State Bar is responsible for investigating allegations 
of the unlawful practice of law.  Generally, enforcement of 
prohibitions on the unlawful practice of law is complaint driven. 
The bar relies on the public to provide information about 
individuals practicing law without a license.  The bar receives 
complaints from judges, injured consumers, lawyers and other 
state bar associations.  Complaints are forwarded to the Unlawful 
Practice of Law Committee of the Oregon State Bar. This 
committee consists of about sixteen lawyers and two public 
members, all volunteers appointed by the OSB Board of 
Governors.  Each complaint is assigned to a member of the 
committee for investigation.  The investigator contacts the 
complaining party and the person being accused of practicing law 
without a license, and makes other investigation as the facts 
warrant.  The investigator then prepares a report, which is 
considered by the entire committee at its monthly public 
meetings.  Except in the most complicated cases, the time from 
initial complaint to consideration by the UPL committee is about 
six months. The UPL committee has authority to: dismiss a 
complaint if there is insufficient evidence; send a notice letter, 
warning that the accused’s activities could be considered the 
unlawful practice of law; issue a cautionary letter advising the 
accused that the committee has evidence that the accused 
engaged in the unlawful practice of law; enter into a cease and 
desist agreement with the accused; or, recommend to the Oregon 
State Bar Board of Governors that the Oregon State Bar file a 
lawsuit against the accused to prevent him or her from continuing 
to practice law without authorization.  Occasionally, if an 
investigation suggests that there has been some illegal activity 
that the UPL committee cannot address, then the UPL committee 
will forward the results of its investigation to other state bars, to 
the Oregon Attorney General, or to another appropriate 
regulatory or law enforcement agency.   
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Oregon If the UPL committee refers a complaint to the Oregon State Bar 
Board of Governors, and the board authorizes a lawsuit, the usual 
relief sought is an injunction against the continuation of the 
unlawful practice of law. OR. REV. STAT. 9.166 (2011).  The 
OSB may also seek restitution for any victims.  The OSB can 
also recover attorney’s fees and other expenses of litigation.  




Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Broad No 
Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
The attorney general and county prosecutors have responsibility 




Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Appearance or acting as an 
attorney of another person before 
a court, legal advice for 
consideration, representing 
another in a capacity to dispose 
of a case, and preparation or 
drafting of specific documents 
which require legal knowledge 
are usually prepared by lawyers. 
 





Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 




 221. Frequently Asked Questions, OR. ST. B., http://www.osbar.org/UPL/faq.html#g (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 222. ABA 2012 UPL SURVEY, supra note 89, chart I. 
 223. Linder v. Ins. Claims Consultants, Inc., 560 S.E.2d 612, 622–23 (S.C. 2002). 
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South 
Carolina 
Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
The South Carolina Bar’s UPL Committee may share this 
information (in a complaint filed with the bar) with other persons 
and agencies in an effort to improve the protection of citizens and 




Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Broad  
Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
 
 
Tennessee Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Broad Yes, but consumers may 
only file complaints with the 
attorney general’s office; the 
attorney general litigates the 
actual claim.225 
Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
The Office of the Attorney General can file civil lawsuits against 
individuals and companies engaged in the unauthorized practice 




 224. Form 4, Unauthorized Practice of Law (UPL) Complaint Form, available at  
www.scbar.org/public/files/docs/UPLform.doc. 
 225. ABA 2012 UPL SURVEY, supra note 89, chart I; Caitlin Doty, Combating the 
Unauthorized Practice of Law in Tennessee, L. LOGIX (Sept. 17, 2012), 
http://www.lawlogix.com/blog/combating-unauthorized-practice-law-tennessee (“To start 
the process, consumers file UPL complaints directly with the Attorney General’s office. . . .  
[T]he State is absolutely dependent upon consumers making complaints in order to take 
action.”); cf. State of Tenn. Office of the Attorney Gen., Op. 02-078, at 2 (2002), available 
at http://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/op/2002/op/op78.pdf (stating that the Tennessee 
attorney general enforces the Tennessee UPL statute). 
 226. Prosecuting the Unauthorized Practice of Law, OFF. ATT’Y GEN. ST. TENN., 
http://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/upl/upl.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
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Texas Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Broad (specifically excludes 
creation, publication, sale, 
distribution of forms, books, 
computer software, etc., if the 
products clearly and 
conspicuously state that the 
product is not a substitute for the 
advice of an attorney). 
Yes227 
Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
The Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee of the Texas 
Supreme Court (UPLC) delegates the investigation of UPL 
complaints to investigators who are members of local 
subcommittees appointed by the UPLC.  The UPLC meets at 
least twice a year to receive reports from its regional and district 
chairpersons and votes whether to authorize civil court lawsuits 
to enjoin the unauthorized practice of law.  If suit is authorized, 
the suit is prosecuted for the UPLC by volunteer attorneys.  The 
UPLC cannot give advisory opinions about whether a certain 
activity is UPL.228 
 
Utah Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Narrow (representing another 
before a tribunal or holding 








 227. Hoppock, supra note 97, at 733–34. 
 228. TEX. UPL COMM., http://www.txuplc.org (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
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Utah Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
The Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee is comprised of 
volunteer Utah attorneys and paralegals who investigate 
complaints against individuals and organizations based upon 
Utah Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice Rule 14-802, 
which governs authorization to practice law in the State of Utah.  
The committee meets monthly to evaluate complaints and report 
on investigations.  Despite the serious consequences that the 
unauthorized practice of law can have on innocent victims, the 
unauthorized practice of law is not a crime in Utah.  The 
committee itself cannot arrest people who violate Utah Supreme 
Court Rules of Professional Practice Rule 14-802 or impose 
monetary sanctions.  The committee also cannot file lawsuits on 
behalf of complainants.229 
 
Vermont Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Broad No 
Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
Enforcement by attorney general and county prosecutors.230 
 
Virginia Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Broad (advice to another is only 
the practice of law if 







 229. Bar Committee:  Unauthorized Practice of Law, UTAH ST. B., http://silk.utahbar.org/
bar-operations/bar-committee-upl/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 230. ABA 2012 UPL SURVEY, supra note 89, chart I. 
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Virginia Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
The ethics counsel and staff screen incoming complaints and 
open files for investigation if there is probable cause to believe 
that a nonlawyer is holding himself or herself out as authorized to 
practice law or is engaging in UPL.  The case is then assigned to 
an investigator.  The Standing Committee on Unauthorized 
Practice of Law determines the disposition of UPL complaints 
based upon the investigators’ written reports and the 
recommendations of the ethics counsel and staff.   
 
Washington Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Broad; however, there is a  
specific exemption for the sale of 
legal forms in any format. 
Yes231 
Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
The Practice of Law Board (administered by the Washington Bar 
Association) was established by the supreme court, in part to 
investigate and enforce UPL.  They attempt to enter into cease 
and desist agreements with violators of UPL statutes.  The board, 
however, has limited enforcement authority and refers cases to 




Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Broad Yes233 
Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
 
 
Wisconsin Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Narrow No 
 
 231. Hoppock, supra note 97, at 733–34. 
 232. ABA 2012 UPL SURVEY, supra note 89, chart I. 
 233. McMahon v. Advanced Title Servs. Co. of W. Va., 607 S.E.2d 519, 523 (W. Va. 
2004). 
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Wisconsin Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
Only enforcement is per statute by county prosecutors.234 
 
Wyoming Definition of “Practice” Permits a Private Cause of 
Action for UPL 
Broad No 
Procedures for Complaining to Enforcement Agency 
The Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee, appointed by the 
supreme court, shall receive complaints alleging the unauthorized 
practice of law and shall investigate those complaints and initiate 
litigation in the district court for injunctive relief or criminal 
contempt proceedings.  The committee may retain the services of 




 234. ABA 2012 UPL SURVEY, supra note 89, chart I. 
 235. Rules of Procedure Governing Unauthorized Practice of Law, WY. JUD. BRANCH, 
http://courts.state.wy.us/CourtRules_Entities.aspx?RulesPage=UnauthorizedPracticeOfLaw.
xml (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
